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1. Introduction 
1.1 Thesis 
1.1.1 Main thesis 
My main thesis is an argument for a foundation or sketches for a philosophy of 
interdisciplinary science of behavior. By interdisciplinary science I specifically mean 
an understanding of how biological evolution and culture co-determine individual 
human behavior—thus seamlessly incorporating a biological, anthropological and 
psychological perspective, respectively. More generally I mean an understanding of 
how biology, as base science, should relate to psychology, and how it subsequently 
should relate to cultural anthropology, as a model for other social sciences. The 
viewpoint of how these sciences relate provides an implied, broader framework, 
within which the more specific main thesis is argued and discussed, and which the 
subject matter of the essay is limited to. 
Specifically, the main thesis is an argument for a renewal or refinement of 
radical behaviorism, a distinct philosophy of psychology (Skinner, 1976), to 
accommodate modern evolutionary biology, thus providing a slightly improved, 
more seamless understanding of the relationship between biological evolution, 
learning and culture. I call this position Neo-Darwinian radical behaviorism. 
A distinct framework of interconnected scientific disciplines, which I propose, 
also illustrates the main thesis. This framework, or table, is organized according 
to phylogenetic, ontogenetic and cultural levels along the X-axis, while organized 
according to proximate and ultimate explanatory modes along the Y-axis. 
I refer to a ”foundation” or ”sketches”, as there will still be a lot of important details, 
elaborations, revisions, etc. to work out for such an ambitious project. 
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1.1.2 Sub-theses: Three syntheses 
The essay consists of three sub-theses, all of which form integral parts of the main 
thesis. Each sub-thesis has been assigned to a chapter of its own. Each sub-thesis also 
takes the dialectical form of a synthesis. 
The first sub-thesis, covered in chapter 3, “Synthesis between modern evolutionary 
biology and radical behaviorism”, is an attempt to describe the relationship 
between biological evolution (phylogenetic adaptation) and learning (ontogenetic 
adaptation (Cleaveland, 2002; Skinner, 1966)) consistent with some principles 
that mark modern evolutionary biology. Among them are individual genetic 
differences, and their role as variation in intra-population differential 
reproductive success, as part of the more modern understanding of natural 
selection, as opposed to older group selection theories. 
The second sub-thesis, covered in chapter 4 “A modern synthesis for ontogeny”, is 
a suggestion for a synthesis between radical behaviorism and neurophysiology, 
encompassing mainstream, mentalist, cognitivist perspectives in psychology, 
modeled after the modern evolutionary synthesis between Mendelian genetics 
and Darwinian evolutionary biology. This sub-thesis builds naturally upon the 
argument for a “rich phenotype”, or large set of phylogenetic adaptations 
relevant to human psychology in chapter 3, further suggesting that operant 
conditioning is one of many phylogenetic adaptations, but shaping, governing 
and interconnecting these under what I call an operant regime.  
The third sub-thesis, of chapter 5, “Seamless causal relationship between biological 
evolution and culture”, draws together the threads from the two former chapters, 
in an attempt to provide some insight into how an understanding of operant 
conditioning, based in modern evolutionary biology, can prove beneficial for 
culture theory. I argue, among others, that a theory of culture and cultural 
evolution can be formed, which has the autonomy that does justice to the 
phenomenon of culture, while still relating to natural selection and phylogenetic 
evolution—through reinforcement, as discussed in chapter 3. 
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1.1.3 Recurring themes 
Psychology, as a modern scientific discipline, suffers somewhat from the limited 
logical flexibility afforded to understanding how behavior is caused. Within a logical 
framework of ”either-or”, there is a debate about whether behavior is controlled by 
mental mechanisms or ”reward and punishment” (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). 
In practical application, on the other hand, an equally weak logic of ”both” is often 
applied. For example, Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology defines psychology as 
“the scientific study of behavior and mental processes” (Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, 
Bem, & Nolem-Hoeksema, 2000, p. 3), as if behavior and mental processes belong to 
the same explanatory categories, and as if mental processes are somehow non-
behavioral. As I will argue, this is logically equivalent to defining biology as 
something like “the scientific study of genes, phenotypes and evolution.” It doesn’t 
sound that bad, but in biology, one of the major theoretical and conceptual 
innovations of the 20th century was the understanding of how genetics and biological 
evolution belong to different, complementary explanatory categories. Genes are 
proximate causes of phenotypes and behavior, while the phylogenetic evolutionary 
process is an ultimate cause, selecting the genes, which in turn provide a proximate 
causal contribution to the phenotype. In a related manner, genes are viewed as 
replicators, while organisms and organismic phenotypic traits are viewed as 
interactors in the evolutionary process—a core concept in the influential view known 
as gene-selectionism1 (Dawkins, 1999, Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). 
Could it be that psychology may benefit from a similar distinction between behavior-
environment functional interaction, most notably learning processes, which take form 
as the ultimate causal, explanatory categorical contribution of the lifetime history of 
the organism (ontogeny, culture), and the organismic structure, particularly brain and 
central nervous system, which encapsulate mental states, replicating and proximately 
                                            
1 To be precise, Dawkins himself uses the expression ”vehicles”, to denote to organisms as vehicles, which genes use to 
replicate themselves, instead of interactors. See, for example (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, p. 55). 
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causing behavior? Yes, I will argue, in fact the current paradigm of cognitivist 
evolutionary psychology, holding that “behaviors are caused by a small set of 
cognitive mechanisms” (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, p. 321) (parallel to saying that 
“genes, not evolution” cause phenotypic, adaptive traits in biological evolution), 
prevents a seamless understanding of how evolutionary biology and culture, through 
social learning, co-determine human behavior, by disregarding behavior-environment 
relations as ontogenetic, ultimate causes of behavior. 
The received view of the relationship between biology and psychology 
This weak and misguided logic stems from what I call the received view of the 
relationship between biology and psychology. The received view uses structural 
delimitation to draw a line between biology and psychology. Biology concerns 
physiology, neurophysiology, genetics and biological evolution, while psychology is 
the realm of mind, consciousness and sub-consciousness, mental states, language, 
mental symbolic manipulation, and even culture. 
This essentially structuralist viewpoint views environmental (ontogenetic) variables 
as outside the organism, providing input in terms of stimuli or information. The 
organismic structure, most essentially its ”psychological” structures—mental states—
processes and represents the information, and returns an output in terms of a 
behavioral response. The ”biological” structures, neurobiology, are considered to 
underlie these mental capacities and are thus identified with the organism, as a set of 
mediating variables. 
This viewpoint may serve the psychologist fine as a theoretical model of how a single 
stimulus is mediated by the organismic structure, which in turn outputs, or returns, a 
single response—the S-O-R model, stimulus-organism-response. 
The severe problems arise, however, when one attempts to describe how behavior is 
caused, or rather, co-determined, by environmental (ontogenetic) variables, versus 
genetic (by proxy, phylogenetic) variables. The structuralist delimitation between 
biology and psychology already identifies biology with the mediating organism in the 
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stimulus-organism-response model. The environment however, is identified with the 
stimulus and the response. 
However, ontogeny is certainly not the only ultimate causal factor determining 
human behavior. The nature-nurture-dichotomy, for all its faults, at least correctly 
identifies genes and environment as the principal co-determinants of human behavior 
(though, as I will argue, in terms of incompatible causal categories). 
Phenotype and behavior (or heritable dispositions as such) is firstly caused through 
phylogenetic evolution, most notably by natural and sexual selection2. Then the living 
organismic phenotype and its behavior are further shaped through the course of its 
lifetime, by what may broadly be called ontogenetic contingencies, particularly 
learning, including social, cultural learning. In this thesis I draw upon Skinner’s 
radical behaviorist perspective, and its scientific core component operant psychology, 
which proposes operant conditioning (reinforcement) as a defining causal mode in 
ontogeny, similar to that of natural selection in phylogeny (Skinner, 1981). 
A better way to understand the relationship between biology and psychology 
The problem with the structuralist model is that it distinguishes between psychology 
and biology along false lines. Mental states are just as much a product of biological 
evolution as their publicly observable neurological embodiment. In fact, mental states 
may not even fruitfully be considered as structurally distinct from their ”underlying” 
biological structures, reminiscent of Cartesian substance dualism. 
Furthermore, the environment (or ontogeny, including culture in the case of 
organisms capable of social learning) cannot possibly be represented in the form of a 
single stimulus, or any amount of S-O-R relations. The lifetime history of the 
organism involves an endless amount of stimuli and events influencing, changing its 
                                            
2 I actually prefer to include sexual selection under a wider umbrella definition of natural selection, as prospective sexual 
partners may be seen as part of the (social) environment relative to a single organism, but I am no authority on the matter. I 
suppose this boils down to whether the social environment is considered distinct from the natural environment, or like I see 
it, a sub-component of it. 
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behavior, not just isolated from each other, but as incremental chains over long time 
spans, and by countless associations to each other. 
The role of consequences 
S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) also ignores the significance of a consequent 
stimulus, in one organism-environment relation (behaviorism stresses behavior-
environment relation to be precise (Skinner, 1976)), as an antecedent stimulus in a 
future behavior-environment relation. To put this in a more comprehensible way, and 
more to the point, S-O-R ignores the role of consequences as shaping, and causal 
antecedents to, behavior. 
This role of consequences is widely accepted as a principal causal mode (or 
functional-historical process) in the evolutionary history of species and (other) 
biological populations (phylogeny), most commonly called natural selection, 
whereby fitness (amount of offspring surviving to reproductive age, their subsequent 
amount of offspring, and so on) is the antecedent to phenotypic adaptive traits and 
behavior. 
For many reasons, the role of past consequences in determining, shaping behavior 
during ontogeny has been widely ignored within psychology, with the exception of its 
championing perspective, behaviorism. The structuralist distinction between biology 
and psychology is held firm by folk psychological notions that that our actions are 
caused by our conscious will—our mental capacities, or mental processing 
(cognitivist lingo), or mental modules (cognitivist evolutionary psychology). History 
and controlling, shaping stimuli is necessarily associated with determinism in the 
sense of causal control, while the mediating organism in S-O-R may more easily be 
associated with choice, or internal locus control, as causally mediating factor. 
Having said this, there are infinitely more sophisticated defenses of mental processing 
as principal cause of behavior, for example by Dennett. I will attend to some of his 
perspectives later in the essay. 
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1.2 Summary 
In this chapter I briefly go through the coming chapters in the thesis. 
Genes and environment are incompatible causal categories. Genes are proximate 
causes, while the environment remains a matter of ultimate causation, similar to its 
attributed role in evolutionary biology, only then shaping the organism and its 
behavior through the course of its lifetime (ontogeny), rather than the heritable traits 
(gene-pool) of its ancestral species/population through the course of its evolutionary 
history (phylogeny). 
A better way to understand behavior is to compare compatible causal categories—the 
shaping of behavior through the lifetime history of the organism, compared to the 
shaping of behavior through the evolutionary history of species and populations; in 
other words, to exchange the nature-nurture perspective with a perspective of 
phylogeny-ontogeny. 
Skinner (1966) puts forward such a perspective in The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of 
Behavior (Phylogeny-Ontogeny). Meanwhile he presents a view of how behavior is 
selected and shaped on three levels, through natural selection in phylogeny, operant 
conditioning in ontogeny, and special modes of operant conditioning on a cultural 
level, in Selection by Consequences (Consequences) (Skinner, 1981). 
Skinner's outline provides an interesting and valuable outlook on how behavior is 
shaped through phylogeny and ontogeny, and within cultures. 
Problems and challenges with Skinner's outlook also arise, however. 
Evolutionary biologist Maynard-Smith criticizes Skinner for having an outdated view 
of evolution (Smith, 1988), which I find to be the case. 
Eysenck, the well-known personality psychologist, criticizes Skinner for ignoring 
individual differences—reminding Skinner that what may be positively reinforcing to 
an introvert can be negatively reinforcing to an extrovert. 
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I argue for a solution to these problems by building a framework where behaviorism 
seamlessly extends modern evolutionary biology: A neo-Darwinian behaviorism. 
In modern evolutionary biology the very process of natural selection is considered 
work on an intra-population level. In old Darwinism, the view that Skinner based his 
approach on (1990), whole species or groups were considered to be the proper units 
of selection, arising and competing among each other for survival—differential 
reproductive success between whole competing groups and species—called group 
selection. Among the insights of modern evolutionary biology, however, is that the 
central component of differential reproductive success is within the population. 
Another important breakthrough in modern evolutionary biology was the modern 
evolutionary synthesis, which brought together Mendelian genetics and Darwinian 
evolutionary biology. This synthesis would combine two explanatory approaches, 
Mendelian genetics on the one hand and Darwinian evolutionary theory, that had 
hitherto been competing theories of human evolution, into a seamlessly 
complementary theoretical framework.  
Meanwhile, in my criticism of nature-nurture I argue that that the environment in 
ontogeny is an ultimate causal factor or explanatory mode, appropriate to ontogeny, 
or psychology. If the environment is an ultimate causal factor in ontogeny, what then 
should we consider to be the proximate causal factor? Could it be that ontogenetic 
contingencies, especially learning, are ultimate causal factors appropriate to 
psychology, while the organismic structure, more specifically its neurophysiological 
structure, is a proximate cause of behavior. In doing so, I argue for a modern 
synthesis in psychology, for ontogeny; based on, and parallel to, the classical modern 
synthesis between Darwinism and Mendelian genetics, for phylogeny. 
Rather than going into detail on the role of the brain and its neurophysiological 
properties (which could easily fit a dissertation of its own), I simply identify and 
propose the brain and central nervous system as the central locus of behavior 
replication in ontogeny, parallel to role of genomes (gene-pools) in phylogenetic 
evolution. Accordingly we should look the brain and central nervous system for 
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proximate explanations of the behavior of organisms throughout their lifetime, and 
for ultimate explanations of behavior of organisms in the combined product of 
ontogenetic, cultural contingencies and the phylogenetic contingencies they extend. 
This certainly solves some problems related to the question of locus of control in 
psychology. It is not anymore a question of whether behavior is caused by mental 
mechanisms, or reward and punishment.  A synthesis implies that behavior is 
proximately caused by neurophysiological states, which incorporate private, mental 
states, like the cognitivist (at least if he was versed in philosophy of mind) would 
hold, while ultimately caused by ontogenetic contingencies, particularly learning.  
This outlook offers a standard by which to view phylogenetic, naturally selected 
adaptations. They may be considered to be shaped by natural selection through 
phylogeny, then be realized, tuned and further shaped through learning, principally 
operant conditioning, during the lifetime, under what I call an operant regime. 
Finally, I try to draw a full circle, towards my original goal, providing an analysis of 
how we may view evolutionary biology in relation to culture. 
I criticize one of the prominent theories of cultural evolution proposed by cognitivist 
evolutionary psychology, memetics, for lacking a notion of selecting consequence, 
and lacking any distinction between replicator and interactor. All of which my 
proposed Neo-Darwinian radical behaviorism have, I argue, to great benefit for 
understanding the seamless causal relationship between evolutionary biology, the 
learning organism and culture. 
Finally, I provide a summary and a conclusion. Among my concluding thoughts are 
that I think that the relevance of operant conditioning to human behavior and cultural 
evolution, is still one of the most interesting questions to be asked within 
evolutionary biology and psychology. Operant conditioning truly is the alternative 
theory to mainstream psychology. The question is if there is a selecting consequence 
in ontogeny—an omnipresent functional patterns that defines it, or, like Dennett 
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suggests, natural selection would have never favored operant conditioning, over 
thousands of other adaptations relevant to human psychology (1995). 
On the more general note of the implications of viewing the psychology of man in 
terms of causal categories, proximate and ultimate, I feel confident that this will one 
day be mainstream. Either there will have to be built a psychology of learning within 
cognitive psychology, which deals with how the behavior of man is incrementally 
changed by the environment over time, or it will have to truly accommodate the 
behaviorist approach to learning. Not based on naive S-O-R terms, where cognitivism 
describes the contribution of the organism ("O") and behaviorism describes the 
contribution of the environment ("S-R"). Rather, as I argue as a central sub-thesis, 
radical behaviorism (SD-R-SR) will deal with ultimate causes and explanations of 
behavior appropriate to psychology (ontogeny extending phylogeny), while 
neurophysiology, encapsulating the mainstream, cognitivist approach to psychology, 
will find its appropriate role in providing proximate explanations of human behavior. 
Without getting into complex questions of philosophy of mind, psychology as natural 
science identifies neurophysiology first, then mental states as private properties of 
that neurophysiology. 
Let empirical evidence decide, I say, but let good philosophy of science provide a 
foundation for theories about the world to be built upon. 
1.3 A note on causation 
I have not dealt exclusively with the subject of causation in this essay. The Darwinian 
evolutionary process, of variation, selection and retention, is probably often seen as a 
distinct kind or type of causation, or “causal mode” (Skinner, 1981). I find it helpful 
to view biological evolution as simply a process (consisting of more basic causal 
parts), rather than necessarily a special mode or type of causation. Sometimes I refer 
to the Darwinian evolutionary process, and also operant conditioning, as historical-
functional processes, denoting to how variation has been selected historically based 
 14 
on a measure their functioning (for example, by reproductive success in the case of 
the Darwinian evolutionary process). 
I use the word causation throughout the essay in a common sense, though scientific, 
sense to denote to temporal antecedents reasonably thought to be of causal 
significance. Addressing causation per se could of course be of great value to the 
subject matter, especially operant conditioning, as it would deal with the extent to 
which antecedent selecting consequences can be considered to cause behavior, rather 
than simply forming a functional or correlational (Skinner, 1969, p. 89) relation 
between independent (reinforcing stimulus, ”reward”) and dependent variable 
(behavioral response). 
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2. Background 
2.1.1 A philosophical issue? 
Behaviorism is not the science of human behavior; it is the philosophy 
of that science. (Skinner, 1976, p. 3) 
To me philosophy of science, especially one addressing a specific science, like 
biology or psychology, is about laying the groundwork for scientists to do what they 
do best: To form hypotheses, theories and test them against empirical data. It can be 
argued that science can be done without much attention to philosophy of science 
besides a basic scientific method, but I imagine that much time will be wasted. 
Psychology is a good example. The one discipline that needs attention from 
philosophy the most, due to the difficult nature of its subject matter, seems to me to 
have left the nest of philosophy prematurely. While biology is sharply divided into 
specific fields, evolution, genetics, physiology, of which mutual and relative causal 
relevance are hardly ever mistaken, psychology remains a muddled field, pretending 
to study mental states, cognition, emotion, neurobiology, behavior and learning, and 
so on, without very serious attention to mutual and relative causal, explanatory 
categorization. 
Questions that reach unbearable complexity and levels of speculation in the 
philosophy of mind, may, I think, at least be pragmatically and tentatively solved 
within philosophy of science. For example, the nature and function of consciousness 
may be out of reach of both current scientific research and settlement of analytic 
questions within philosophy of mind, but the causal status of mental states versus 
neurophysiology for the purpose of a less messy psychological science may be within 
reach. I envisage a psychology that is divided into studies belonging to distinct causal 
categories, much like genetics relative to evolutionary biology. Building on the 
philosophy of psychology known as behaviorism I seek to outline a seamless 
understanding of the causal relationship between evolutionary biology and culture, 
with psychology of learning as the linking discipline. This very process includes what 
I brand a modern synthesis for psychology, modeled after the modern synthesis of 
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evolutionary biology, between Darwinian evolutionary biology and Mendelian 
genetics, which is the essential premise of today’s Neo-Darwinism. This includes the 
key distinction between proximate and ultimate causation, which greatly clarifies the 
subject matters of biology, or phylogeny, but which plays no role in psychology, or 
ontogeny. Psychology is still filled with questions of whether behavior is caused by 
mental states (cognitivism, or cognitive psychology) or by environmental 
contingencies like reward and punishment (straw man accounts of behaviorism, or 
behavior analysis) (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). 
The interdisciplinary approach I take has a good view from philosophy of science. 
Philosophers are not disproportionately invested in one particular scientific field, 
from which one would then typically form a prism with which to view all other 
sciences. Besides their arm chair of course. I have not fought it very vigorously in 
this thesis. My focus is generally very philosophical and theoretical, leaving 
empirical support or dismissal to science itself. For example, I do not take a 
standpoint as to the relevance of learning versus evolutionary biology regarding some 
human behavioral repertoire. Instead I hope to outline what is perhaps a better way to 
answer such questions. I think that a philosophy of science that prematurely or 
statically answers empirical questions is simply bad philosophy of science. Good 
philosophy of science sets the stage for empirical data to work its magic. Then again 
good philosophy of science may be, or perhaps even should be, sensitive to empirical 
findings. If it turns out God is real for example and has endowed mankind with the 
gift of eternal souls and first cause, genuine free will, then perhaps standard 
philosophy of science based on physicalism and approximate determinism may not be 
a good idea anymore. 
2.1.2 What is radical behaviorism? 
Function and Consequence 
The folk psychological notion of behaviorism, that it is concerned with the reward 
and punishment of behavior, is not so much wrong, but a very simplified 
understanding of one its basic philosophical premises. The most significant 
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philosophical influence on behaviorism is pragmatism (Saugstad, 2000). The idea, 
borrowed from pragmatism, is that the function, or one could even say meaning, of a 
behavior is determined by its consequences. 
Operant conditioning is a notion of the controlling stimuli of so-called 
voluntary behavior 
Voluntary behavior, associated with purpose and intention, is seemingly not subject 
to any controlling stimuli, which is part of the reason why the behavior appears so 
free of restraint, or even causation. There is not necessarily any stimuli eliciting a 
response, which is close in time. 
Operant conditioning is a creative mechanism which replaces a creative 
mind 
The cognitive scientist may want to ask himself; which proposed ”mental modules” 
supposedly facilitate human creativity, advancement—the incremental production of 
novel, functional behavioral repertoires, besides a creative mind which itself cannot 
be explained. Can it really take place without a mechanism of variation, selection and 
retention in the course of the lifetime of the individual and/or in the culture over 
time? In behaviorism this challenge is confidently answered by proposing operant 
conditioning as a process of variation, selection and retention in individual learning, 
as well as the surrounding culture (Skinner, 1981). Some type of supply of behavioral 
variation, for example random responses by the organism, recombination of 
responses, or variations triggered by releasing stimuli in the environment constitutes 
the variation. Selection is firstly facilitated by consequences associated with stable 
historical reproductive value in the organism’s ancestral populations/species (primary 
reinforcement), and other consequences, which have gained some logical association 
with primary reinforcers during the course of the organism’s lifetime (secondary 
reinforcement). These consequences select behaviors, which then increase in likely 
frequency of reoccurrence (thus the name reinforcement). The next time the response 
occurs under similar settings (discriminating stimuli), it may be further shaped and 
elaborated upon, by further selecting consequences, thus creating novelty in terms of 
behavioral repertoires. This constitutes a “creative”—constructive—mechanism that 
does not presuppose a creator, or higher intelligence, just like natural selection 
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replaces the need for a creative intelligence or God to explain the existence of life, 
especially complex life. 
Behavior analysis—the science 
We have already covered the aspects of radical behaviorism. Radical behaviorism 
itself is the broad philosophical approach to psychology, operant psychology is the 
central psychological perspective itself. Finally, behavior analysis is the empirical 
science on which the philosophy and psychological perspective has been built, 
inductively. Behavior analysis, according to the radical behaviorist philosophy of 
science, is largely free from a hypothetic-deductive theoretical base. Rather it is an 
inductive empirical analysis of behavior, where theory is formed and shaped from 
what is observed experimentally. The goal of behavior analysis is prediction and 
control of behavior. The operant analysis of behavior, as such, began as an analysis of 
voluntary, purposeful behavior, which is of greater interest, especially in the service 
of understanding human behavior. Voluntary behavior, which seemingly is devoid of 
any triggering, releasing—controlling—stimuli. However, building on Thorndike’s 
Law of Effect (Saugstad, 2000), Skinner found that the controlling stimuli were found 
in the antecedent consequences that shape behavior. Thus prediction and control of 
voluntary, purposeful behavior could be within reach after all, and an operant 
psychology saw the light of day. 
The notion of control 
In radical behaviorism (RB) there is a notion that contingencies control the behavior 
of organisms, including persons. This perspective may be counter-intuitive to many, 
as it may give an association to something similar to puppets with strings attached. 
Such analogy probably isn’t totally way off either, although behaviorism does not 
view man as, or liken man to, a puppet. In RB control refers to the environment as the 
initiating agent, much like a puppet master initiates the behavior of a puppet. There 
are distinct differences though, first of all temporality. Controlling contingencies may 
lie far away in the past. Also the contingencies are thought to shape behavior as a 
matter of cumulative selection (Skinner, 1976). Although it is tempting to speak in 
terms of causation, and as such causal control, the reference to causation is often 
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wisely left out in favor of experimental control, in terms of relationships between 
independent and dependent variables (Skinner, 1969). Where the ice is at its thickest 
one could talk about correlation instead. A bolder, but more accurate and fruitful 
estimation, in my view, is that the contingencies are functional-historical processes. 
Functional because the selecting consequence assigns functional (pragmatic) value to 
the response. Historical because the selecting, shaping consequences form a history 
which the behaviors are a function of.  
Let us go back to temporality. For phylogenetic contingencies, through the insight 
brought by the modern synthesis between Mendelian genetics and Darwinian 
evolutionary biology, it can be said that natural selection co-controls behavior by 
proxy, through the carriers of heritable traits, most centrally genes. This also helps 
explain the notion of how contingencies lying millions of years in the past can be said 
to co-control and co-determine contemporary organismic bodies and their behavior 
(phenotypes). 
I invite the reader not to think in terms of unnecessary complexity, or something 
hidden and overly abstract when thinking about contingencies (although thinking in 
terms of contingencies requires some level of abstraction). A Darwinian contingency 
constitutes variation in terms of heritable traits, selection in terms of differential 
reproductive transfer of those traits, and retention by the transfer of those selected 
traits from one generation to another. The Darwinian contingency is fruitfully 
elaborated upon by distinguishing between replicator and interactor. The interactor is 
the organismic phenotype interacting—surviving and reproducing—with 
environments that pose different problems and challenges. The replicators are the 
genes contributing or corresponding to those traits, which then by definition are 
heritable (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). 
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3. Synthesis between modern evolutionary biology 
and radical behaviorism 
3.1 Nature-Nurture 
Nature-nurture leads evolutionary, psychological thinking astray, as there is strong 
predisposition for asking about which causal factor is most significant and to what 
extent. This is almost always a fruitless, useless way to problematize the relation 
between phylogeny and ontogeny, because the ultimate causal contribution of each 
occurs at (1) different temporal stages, (2) concerns single organisms and populations  
(species) respectively, and (3) thus typically (but not always) provide different and 
complementary causal contributions to the determination of human behavior. 
Dynamic causal categories 
Since nature-nurture conveys a static image of the contribution of genes versus 
environment, the crucial aspect of change, intervention—changes in environmental 
variables, whether by design (read: explicitly) or occurring ”naturally” (read: non-
explicitly)—the dynamic reality of how phylogeny and ontogeny co-determines 
behavior is lost. 
Take for example the notion of genetic versus environmental causes in various 
medical diseases. Based on the heritability factor, the most common form of 
quantifying nature-nurture, such and such amount of variation in a population may be 
considered due to genetic factors, while the remaining part is attributed to 
environmental factors. The most common criticism against accounts of heritability is 
that it only accounts for variation in populations. In a society where everyone smokes 
exactly 20 cigarettes a day, the relevance of genetic factors to lung cancer will sky-
rocket, since the environmental exposure to cigarettes will be very similar for every 
individual, leaving a lot to be determined by individual genetic differences. 
Meanwhile the environmental contribution to lung cancer per individual will be very 
significant, but masked by a system of calculation which is often useless for 
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understanding genetic versus environmental causes in individual organisms and their 
behavior. 
But there is even more damning criticism towards the nature-nurture approach, 
regardless of mode of quantification (in the above case, heritability): Nature-nurture 
inherently fails to recognize that the relative contribution of genes versus 
environment is a function of dynamic causal factors, such as changes in the nonsocial 
or social environment, whether non-explicit (”natural”) or explicit (arranged, 
intervention). The problem with heritability is not just that it deals with variation in 
populations, but its inherent focus on fixed causal contribution accounts, instead of 
recognizing that one of the main interests when estimating the significance of 
ontogeny, is the potential for intervention — the extent to which the systematic 
manipulation of ontogenetic, cultural variables can influence x trait or behavior, 
whether it is a psychiatric disorder, a medical condition, or functioning in school or at 
work. Behavioral geneticists will thus often make the mistake of estimating how 
much the environment matters for x trait or behavior, based on accounts of twin 
studies, where the genetic dispositions are identical (identical twins), but the different 
environments in which these have been raised have no systematic account of 
differences in relevant ontogenetic variables (the identical twins have simply been 
raised in different families of varying cultural difference, for example as part of 
adoption). A truly interesting study, by comparison, would test the effect of 
systematic changes in environmental variables—intervention—between individuals 
(including twins and identical twins—typically in terms of control/non-intervention 
versus intervention) or between groups. 
3.2 Selection by Consequences 
In this chapter I will present the article that lays most of the foundation for my thesis 
and analysis: Skinner’s article Selection by Consequences (Skinner, 1981). 
Skinner argues that three causal modes govern human behavior: Natural selection, 
operant conditioning and a special implementation of operant conditioning where the 
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variation in the behavioral repertoire of organisms is acquired from social learning, 
amounting to cultural evolution (1981). 
Skinner presents selection by consequences as a causal mode “found only in living 
things, or in machines made by living things” (1981, p. 501). As humans are cultural 
living things, Skinner suggests that three kinds of selection by consequences concern 
and govern human behavior. Natural selection is the first and principal mode of 
selection by consequences. Skinner attributes its beginning steps to “that 
extraordinary moment when a molecule came into existence which had the power to 
reproduce itself.” (p. 501). Skinner also identifies reproduction as the consequence in 
natural selection, although he prefers to describe the contingencies associated with 
natural selection as “contingencies of survival”, which I interpret to refer to his group 
or species selection perspective and selection in terms of entire species surviving, 
while others die out. Consistent with modern evolutionary biology, and an intra-
population selection perspective, I will use the term contingencies of fitness. 
Skinner identifies operant conditioning as a second kind of selection by 
consequences, one that has evolved as a product of natural selection. He describes its 
appearance as follows: 
It must have evolved in parallel with two other products of the same 
contingencies of natural selection—a susceptibility to reinforcement by 
certain kinds of consequences and a supply of behavior less specifically 
committed to eliciting or releasing stimuli. (p. 501) 
In other words operant conditioning is composed of variation in behavior that is not 
exclusively controlled by eliciting or releasing stimuli and is susceptible to 
reinforcement by certain consequences. The quote is somewhat confusing: It is 
behavior that is reinforced, so susceptibility to reinforcement must relate to the 
mentioned behaviors. However, the relation is flexible—a behavior can be selected— 
based on its consequences. Furthermore, the behaviors are per definition not 
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specifically (exclusively) committed to eliciting or releasing stimuli3, when they are 
in fact sensitive to reinforcement, but the combination of initial elicitation and 
subsequent reinforcement of a behavior is presumably not uncommon. 
Furthermore, it is explained that food is presumably not reinforcing to a species that 
eats food only because of its survival value. This is in need of explanation, and lacks 
the clarity usually typical of Skinner. Survival value is here presumably pointing to 
“contingencies of survival”, Skinner’s description of the central contingencies in 
phylogenetic evolution, typically associated with natural selection (see earlier 
definition and discussion of natural selection). The main point here is that an event 
(eating food, in the given species) that is only the product of natural selection is 
typically not reinforcing. The food will instead typically become reinforcing when the 
species has developed “special susceptibility” (p. 501) to it in the course of 
phylogenetic evolution. This special susceptibility facilitates ability to learn “new 
ways of gathering, processing, and ultimately cultivating foods”. The point then, is 
that when eating food is just a simple response in a species, food as such will not be a 
reinforcer and is presumably not reinforcing. In a sense it can per definition not be 
reinforcing, as reinforcement is commonly defined functionally in relation to a 
behavior—Skinner is probably implicitly pointing to how in the course of 
phylogenetic evolution, the mutations responsible for one functional trait can very 
well appear with significant temporal space between them. It would have been more 
clarifying if Skinner had simply written that certain events, like eating food, tend to 
become, or simply become, reinforcing to a species, when there has been 
phylogenetic selection for learning new ways to find food. Phylogenetic selection for 
learning new ways to find food, in the case of operant conditioning, constitutes that 
there must be a means of producing behaviors that are not fixed responses (variation) 
and that the future frequency of repetition of those behaviors must be sensitive to the 
(relevant) consequences that they have produced in the past. 
                                            
3 Stimuli that evoke a response or releases a complex fixed response in the organism, in the temporal relation stimulus-
response. 
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Of course, the ability to learn new ways to find food typically has obvious survival 
value, so Skinner’s initial appeal to “survival value” as a non-platform for an event 
being reinforcing, is indeed confusing, even misleading. What Skinner hints at, 
however, and rightly so, is that reinforcement is not directly attached to survival 
value. Operant conditioning frequently selects dysfunctional and maladaptive 
behaviors. Skinner writes: 
New ways of gathering, processing, and ultimately cultivating foods 
and new ways of behaving sexually or of behaving which lead only 
eventually to sexual reinforcement can be shaped and maintained. The 
behavior so conditioned is not necessarily adaptive; foods are eaten 
which are not healthful, and sexual behavior strengthened which is not 
related to procreation. (Skinner, 1981, p. 501) 
Eating food that is unhealthy refers primarily to a reinforcing effect common to 
different stimuli and not to operant behavior specifically, and is as such not the best 
example of reinforcement of maladaptive behavior. The example of sexual behavior 
is better, I think, as it describes clearly how the reinforcing consequences (sexual 
contact) not only reinforce behaviors that have survival value (reproductive value). It 
is also an excellent, yet very simple account of sexual perversion. Sexual perversion 
can plausibly be thought to persist especially when there is no alternative 
reinforcement of sexual contact that has reproductive value—because then there is no 
differential reinforcement that functions to remove the maladaptive sexual behavior. 
3.2.1 Maynard-Smith 
J. Maynard-Smith’s critical response to Consequences is centered around the claim 
that Skinner has an inadequate understanding of evolutionary biology (Smith, 1988). 
I have already noted the distinction between “contingencies of survival” and 
“contingencies of fitness”, which I hold to refer to “survival of the species” and, my 
correction, reproductive success, frequency of offspring, as the principal selecting 
consequence in phylogeny. When I first considered this distinction, and also initially 
upon reading J. Maynard-Smith’s critique, I did not give it very much attention. I 
thought that it was a minor flaw, which would merely require a comment and a 
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correction, without any great bearing on the evaluation of Skinner’s central 
theoretical framework, operant psychology. 
It was not until I read Skinner’s last published article, Can Psychology be a Science 
of the Mind? (Science-Mind), that it finally occurred to me how heavily Skinner’s 
operant psychology is influenced by old, outdated Darwinian theory (1990). In 
Science-Mind Skinner writes: 
[…] the natural selection of the behavior of species (ethology), the 
operant conditioning of the behavior of the individual (behavior 
analysis), and the evolution of the social environments that prime 
operant behavior and greatly expand its range (a part of anthropology). 
(Skinner B. F., 1990, p. 1208)  
And also: 
All types of variation and selection have certain faults, and one of them 
is especially critical for natural selection: It prepares a species only for 
a future that resembles the selecting past. Species behavior is effective 
only in a world that fairly closely resembles the world in which the 
species evolved. (Skinner B. F., 1990, p. 1206) 
Skinner sees natural selection as selecting “the behavior of the species”, while 
operant conditioning selects the “behavior of the individual”. While a convenient 
distinction, this is a serious over-simplification. Here is what I think Skinner has 
thought: Since there are, in his view, phylogenetic contingencies selecting essentially 
whole species, there can be neatly isolable “species behavior” attributable to those 
contingencies. 
Although there is definitely species selection in the sense that whole species can die 
out, whereas others continue to reproduce, due to their respective histories of natural 
selection, this is simply not the basic, fundamental way natural selection works. It is 
more of an emergent/extraordinary way, so to say—at best an auxiliary, peripheral 
part of the evolutionary process. The basic process of natural selection works on the 
intra-population level: Frequency of genes transmitted to subsequent instances of the 
gene pool of the reproductive population (species). Genes are carried by single 
organisms that transmit them differentially to the next generation, compared to other 
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organisms carrying slightly different genetic variation, thus the term differential 
fitness. New species (speciation) do not simply arise from variation, but from a 
population’s history of reproductive isolation (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). 
The group selection perspective becomes problematic in explaining why and how 
natural selection can cause adaptive traits of incremental sophistication. There is no 
variation until whole species have evolved (presumably without shaping by natural 
selection, but as a matter of pure chance), and there is no selection until one succeeds 
and the other does not (or to a larger degree). The species- or group-selectionist sees a 
whole species (or otherwise distinct biological population) emerging from random 
variation, only then to be subject to differential selection compared to other species. 
Skinner probably viewed the human species in this fashion—it has been favored over 
other species in terms of group survival, and has a species-specific behavioral 
repertoire to show for it. This is not principally how the human species has evolved, 
but it does not deviate enough from newer Darwinism to create a great problem for 
Skinner’s theorization, yet. 
It is when Skinner treats the level of the individual organism that the implications of 
old Darwinian theory have truly negative consequences: Having attributed “species 
behavior” to “contingencies of survival” of, presumably, entire species, in phylogeny, 
Skinner attributes “individual behavior” to “contingencies of reinforcement”, in 
ontogeny. Not only does this neglect genetic individual differences, which are 
undoubtedly a matter of “individual behavior” of phylogenetic, naturally selected 
origin, but also more importantly, individual behavior is, apart from a foundation or 
endowment of “species behavior”, attributed almost entirely to operant conditioning, 
which is held to be responsible for the selection of individual repertoires. The result is 
what I call “flat phenotype” organisms, which share some unfortunate similarities 
with another well-known notion, namely the blank slate, or tabula rasa, something 
Skinner has been criticized heavily for, but mostly from people who did not 
understand his overall theory, confusing it with S-R psychology and/or mistakenly 
requesting attention to the contribution of the organism, along the lines of the 
structuralist organism-environment dichotomy (S-O-R), most notably Chomsky 
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(1967). The flat phenotype organism is only endowed with a relatively simple set of 
innate behavioral repertoires, some biological constraints on learning, and a set of 
primary reinforcers. This is already far from a blank slate view, since primary 
reinforcers themselves have major implications on behavior, something which 
Skinner often pointed out, while also pointing out their phylogenetic origin (1981, p. 
501). But as Eysenck points out (1988, p. 424), Skinner does not take into account 
(genetic) individual differences in reinforcement as a matter of (unlearned, innate) 
personality traits, something that would require a notion of individual behavioral 
disposition of phylogenetic (proximately, genetic) origin. 
According to Skinner, the entire individual behavioral repertoire is largely, or even 
principally, built by operant conditioning during the lifetime. The main problem here 
is not so much the individual, because operant conditioning (and learning generally) 
probably accounts for a lot of the details in an individual-specific repertoire, but the 
notion that operant conditioning alone is mostly (if not solely) responsible for the 
behavior. The most fallacious result is that Skinner over-estimates the exclusive role 
of operant conditioning in shaping the behavior acquired during the lifespan of the 
organism. 
Table 3-1: Group selection versus intra-population (gene) selection and 
consequences for radical behaviorism 
 Group or species selection Intra-population selection 
(typically viewed in terms of 
gene selection) 
Historical association Old Darwinism Modern evolutionary biology; 
Neo-Darwinism 
   
Association to behaviorism Radical behaviorism (Skinner, 
1976) 
Proposed in this thesis as an 
integral part of synthesis 
between modern evolutionary 
biology and radical 
behaviorism. I have thus called 
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the proposed position Neo-
Darwinian radical behaviorism 
Provenance of behavior Phylogenetic contingencies 
govern species behavior, while 
ontogenetic contingencies 
govern individual behavior 
(Skinner, 1981; 1990) 
Phylogenetic contingencies 
shape populations and species 
based on differential selection 
of individual genetic 
differences within the 
population. Individual genetic 
differences, shaped by 
phylogenetic contingencies, are 
thus an integral part of 
individual behavior. 
Role of ontogeny versus 
phylogeny in shaping 
behavior 
Phylogeny and ontogeny shape 
different behavioral repertoires 
(innate versus learned) 
(Skinner, 1990) 
Phylogeny shapes a host of 
adaptations relevant to 
behavior, of which the learning 
processes are central, but not 
omnipotent, in ontogeny 
(division of labor between 
phylogeny and ontogeny—
“innate versus learned” only 
occasionally fruitful 
distinction) 
Implications “Flat phenotype”—limited 
acknowledgement of naturally 
selected contribution to 
behavior; primary 
reinforcement, species-specific 
constraints on learning, innate, 
simple respondent behaviors 
(Skinner, 1990). Typically 
confused with tabula rasa, 
lacking understanding of the 
nature of primary 
reinforcement. 
“Rich phenotype”—operant 
conditioning is one of many 
phylogenetic adaptations. Its 
special relevance to ontogeny 
and culture rests on the fact that 
it is a creative causal process 
(causal mode) (Skinner, 1981), 
and that it constitutes an 
ontogenetic measurement of 
function thus relating 
specifically to the natural 
functionalism and pragmatism 
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of human behavior. 
 
One of my premiere goals in this thesis, if not the goal, is to establish a neo-
Darwinian operant psychology, and in contrast with Skinner’s attribution of levels of 
selection, I emphasize that ontogenetic contingencies are extensional. Instead of a flat 
phenotypic view of organisms, especially humans, one must acknowledge a rich 
phenotype, with a potential host of phylogenetic, naturally selected adaptations of 
relevance to behavior, such as memory, hypothesis testing (Popperian, advanced 
Skinnerian capability), even potential support for advanced verbal behavior. 
However, I insist that my efforts are mostly a matter of refining and updating the 
theoretical coherence between operant psychology and Darwinism—the changes are, 
I suggest, incremental and evolutionary in their own right, rather than so much a 
denouncement of traditional operant psychology, or a revolutionary change. At the 
heart of my project lies the translation of “contribution of the organism” (Chomsky, 
1967) (which is a mistaken but understandable criticism against operant psychology) 
to contingencies, phylogenetic and ontogenetic. My contention is that the structural 
properties of the organism, which many seem to want to somehow accompany the 
operant analysis (an impossibility due to causal categorical incompatibility), can 
instead be taken into account theoretically by formulating them as naturally selected 
adaptations alongside operant conditioning (itself a phylogenetic adaptation). My 
Neo-Darwinian approach to operant psychology thus ambitiously suggests that a host 
of neurological/psychologically relevant phylogenetic adaptations work alongside 
operant conditioning during the lifetime of the organism—I call this arrangement an 
operant regime. The functional analysis of verbal behavior offered by Skinner is still 
of great importance, as culture—verbal communities—carries a lot of (if not most of) 
the behavioral variation and repertoires responsible for advanced verbal behavior. 
Cultural operant selection and evolution has no doubt greatly advanced the 
complexity of language. Language could probably never have evolved as a process of 
natural selection alone—it is a signature product of co-evolutionary process (see 
chapter 3.4 below for a discussion of the Baldwin Effect, which has some similarities 
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and properties in common with co-evolution). I do however suggest that there is 
naturally selected support for advanced verbal behavior in humans, something which 
Baldwinian selection alone, suggests. 
The Neo-Darwinian view, as I formulate and see it, requires at least one important 
thing: Acknowledgement of the significance of other naturally selected adaptations 
than operant conditioning on the behavior acquired during the lifetime of the 
organism. A flat phenotype view sees the genetic endowment only as functional for 
contributing with a minimal set of responses, with which the organism has acquired 
from the “problem solving” that the species has encountered, whereas the rest of the 
“problem solving” is done by operant conditioning within the lifetime. A rich 
phenotype view acknowledges the working of phylogenetic adaptations throughout 
the lifetime of the organism. Operant conditioning is not the only kind of problem 
solving feature in ontogeny, though it is the most important one (since it features 
variation, selection, retention, where selecting consequences are found in the real 
environment). 
Skinner’s species selection view also poses a problem for culture. Skinner borrows 
the emphasis on groups (species) in phylogeny, in species selection, and applies it to 
his treatment of culture. Thus he identifies whole cultures, their total combined set of 
practices, as the principal unit of selection in cultural evolution (Skinner, 1981) 
whereas he should, consistent with a neo-Darwinian analogy, simply identify single, 
particular cultural practices as the proper unit of selection. Given that cultural 
evolution on the basis of cultural contingencies of reinforcement actually occurs, the 
same principles of intra-population selection as apply to biological evolution, are 
bound to apply. Competition between whole sets of cultural practices encapsulated in 
different cultures lacks the abundance of variation, the subjection to persistent, same 
and similar selecting consequences, and consistent, relatively frequent self-
reproduction, that marks a Darwinian-like evolutionary process. It is plausible that 
inter-culture selection is a peripheral, auxiliary evolutionary process, just like group 
selection in phylogeny might be. 
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3.2.2 Barlow—ultimate and proximate causation mistakenly 
identified with biological evolution and culture, respectively 
Barlow (1988) presents an interesting criticism of Consequences. He argues that 
Skinner makes a mistake by not distinguishing between proximate and ultimate 
causal mechanisms, regarding kin-selection in phylogenetic evolution and selection 
of behavior benefiting the cultural group, at maladaptive cost of the individual, on the 
ontogenetic, cultural level. He claims that kin-selection favoring heroic behavior 
(example of behavior which is maladaptive to the individual, but beneficial to the 
group) is the ultimate causation, while teaching of heroic behavior in contemporary 
cultural communities is the proximate causation (Barlow, 1988, p. 22). 
What we have here is a failure to distinguish between proximate and 
ultimate mechanisms (E. O. Wilson 1975) [Barlow’s reference]. The 
hero is taught to behave that way, which is the proximate mechanism. 
In small societies in which heroism must have evolved, the hero’s kin 
enjoyed improved reproductive fitness to that of individuals who were 
not so easy to train. This is kin selection, the ultimate causation. A 
common generative principle is reasonable.  (Barlow, 1988, p. 22) 
While I agree that a distinction between proximate and ultimate causation is essential 
to understanding levels of selection, Barlow is somewhat mistaken about attribution 
of those causal categories. He essentially bundles cultural as proximate causation and 
phylogenetic evolution as ultimate causation into one science (something like 
sociobiology perhaps?). Thus he blocks understanding of culture as an 
evolutionary—and causal—process distinct from biological evolution. Culture is of 
course not the proximate causation of biological evolution, which is what Barlow 
suggests (that would imply that culture is solely the product of natural selection, and 
can only evolve subject to contingencies of fitness). 
The correct account, I suggest, is something like this: Phylogenetic contingencies, 
including natural selection, are ultimate causes appropriate to evolutionary biology. 
The genotype, and largely phenotypic genetic expression, consists of proximate 
structural causes appropriate to genetics and functional biology/physiology, 
respectively. Ontogenetic contingencies, including operant conditioning, are ultimate 
causes appropriate to psychology of learning (for example radical behaviorism, 
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operant psychology). The structure of the organism at any given time during 
ontogeny is a proximate, structural cause of its behavior, while the ultimate causes of 
its structure, as such, is a product of ontogenetic contingencies extending (combined 
with) phylogenetic contingencies. Cultural contingencies, when viewed as part of 
psychology of learning, are themselves ultimate causes of behavior.  
Barlow’s account is not really wrong though, but limited. His quoted reasoning is 
correct and even quite sophisticated, as he refers to kin-selected learning ability, thus 
actually correctly identifying the susceptibility to learn heroic behavior as a 
proximate explanation, relative to the ultimate, kin-selective contingencies. However, 
it is unclear which role the cultural community has here. Are causal properties 
assigned to it, distinct from biological evolution? Clearly not, besides embodying the 
proximate realization of kin-selective natural selection as ultimate cause. What 
becomes very important here is Skinner’s assertion that operant conditioning is a 
causal mode (1981, p. 501), in a similar vein as natural selection. What this means is 
that operant conditioning produces (or, as I think, often refines, further develops) 
adaptations of incremental sophistication4, in the same way that natural selection 
does, both being proper variation-selection-retention contingencies. Given that no 
such “creative” process takes place in learning or cultural evolution, Barlow’s 
account may be sufficient. After all, of what major significance is learning and 
culture at all, if not as a distinct process of creativity-without-creator that variation-
selection-retention contingencies afford? It was because of this concern that Skinner 
rejected the “the creative mind” (1990), which he attributed to cognitive psychology, 
because it effectively functions as a smoke screen, covering the true contingencies at 
work, which are the three kinds of causal modes described in Consequences (1981). 
When departing from a psychological to an anthropological (cultural) perspective, 
cultural contingencies are seen as part of a cultural whole, a cultural evolution, or at 
least a cultural history. Causes that are ultimate in psychology, focusing on the 
                                            
4 I choose the word ’sophistication’ over ’complexity’, both for natural selection and operant conditioning, to avoid 
appearing to commit the fallacy of asserting that natural selection (and variation-selection-retention contingencies in 
general) always lead to complexity, which they do not. There may simply be selection against complexity or for simplicity. 
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individual, are not ultimate causes in anthropology. Ultimate causes in anthropology 
are a matter of selection of practices extending (and ultimately co-evolving with) 
phylogenetic evolution, principally by cultural, operant selection, covered in chapter 
5 below (wherein the properties of primary reinforcers is the most obvious 
contribution of natural selection, though far from the only one). The structure of 
whole social, cultural communities is the combined outcome of phylogenetic and 
cultural contingencies (including sub-cultural contingencies, for example child-
rearing). In a densely populated social, cultural environment there are few 
ontogenetic contingencies that are neatly isolable from cultural contingencies (unless 
an eremitic, isolated lifestyle is the case), so there can be no helpful distinction 
between “psychological” and “cultural” ontogenetic contingencies in cultural, 
socially learning species.  
Seeing how psychology offers a complicated intermediate understanding of ultimate 
causes appropriate to its field, which are no longer ultimate when considering the 
surrounding cultural whole, may make it tempting to skip psychology altogether 
(which is what gene-culture co-evolution theory and, to a certain extent, sociobiology 
does (Skinner, 1990)). Like Skinner, I think that may be a mistake: 
Sociobiology, for example, leaps from socio- to bio-, passing over the 
linking individual. (Skinner, 1990, p. 1208) 
The individual person is the basic systemic, or structural, unit of cultures, and her 
behavior, how she acquires and transmits new behavioral repertoires during her 
lifetime is a perfect starting point for understanding culture and cultural evolution. 
The exchange of socially learned behavior between individuals—practices, is the 
interacting, functional-historical unit of cultural evolution, as I suggest. Furthermore, 
understanding how the ontogenetic evolution of behavior extends phylogenetic 
evolution of primary reinforcers and other adaptations provides a perfect starting 
point for understanding how natural selection affects culture (including how it 
initially spawned culture by selection of social learning abilities). I propose that 
psychology is no less than the key science for creating a bridge between biological 
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evolution and culture, and I think Skinner also implicitly proposes this in 
Consequences (1981). 
I actually favor a sociobiological perspective when it is restricted to the first level5 of 
selection, natural selection—the science tells us a lot about naturally selected 
behavioral disposition, including social disposition. Level 2 requires a science of 
behavior studying ontogenetic adaptation (learning), and considering level 3 requires 
some sort of science of culture (anthropology), though the latter science can be 
slightly indistinct from its base sciences. Barlow implicitly suggests that level 1 
analysis of culture is preferable and complete—something like an erroneous 
estimation of the scope of sociobiology or evolutionary biology. But his claim does 
prompt an interesting, important question: Why cannot anthropology be viewed 
simply in light of natural selection and phylogenetic evolution? Because culture has 
independent causal bearing on behavior, through naturally selected capacities for 
imitation, observation and verbal instruction, which enable inter-individual transfer of 
behavior—practices—which in turn are subject to operant selection. Why cannot 
psychology consist simply of analysis of contingencies of natural selection? Because 
organisms can learn. If there were not for learning and, by extension, social learning, 
Barlow’s perspective would be correct. There would be no need for analysis of 
behavior beyond evolutionary biology. It would effectively devour psychology and 
anthropology (but then again there would be no culture, and no psychology with any 
substantial subject matter either). 
My evaluation of Barlow’s perspective is that it is an over-simplification that is much 
more serious than Skinner’s account: Cultural practices are not proximate causes of 
phylogenetic contingencies, kin-selective or otherwise. Cultural practices are only 
partly determined by a history of phylogenetic selection. A history of operant 
selection of cultural practices, based on naturally selected primary reinforcers and 
capacity for imitation and observation, constitutes a more plausible case. 
                                            
5 As I explain earlier, Skinner defines three levels, or kinds, of selection. The first level is natural selection in phylogeny, 
second level is operant selection in ontogeny and the third level is cultural operant selection  (1981, p. 501-502). 
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But I agree with Barlow that there is a possible common “generative principle” 
(1988, p. 22) between the cultural practice of promoting heroism, and natural kin-
selection of heroic behavior. Kin-selection may have favored reinforcers that 
constitute sensitivity to consequences affecting kin, for example enabled by 
secondary reinforcement, or more likely, by imprinting. Kin-selective contingencies 
thus extend to ontogeny as a matter of operant selection, but with reinforcement 
within the lifetime as the selecting consequence, rather than inclusive fitness, which 
forms a basis as selecting consequence on the phylogenetic level. Finally cultural, 
operant selection may have favored practices that promote heroism, and promotion of 
the practice will be most effective among relatively close kin. This is far from 
Barlow’s over-simplifying culture = proximate causation, biological evolution = 
ultimate causation. However, I also depart from Skinner on this point, who seems not 
to consider that kin-selection may affect the shaping of primary reinforcers, which 
fits his somewhat isolationist approach to the respective contribution of phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic contingencies, to behavior—in short, he does not see a common 
generative principle (1981). 
Similarly, altruistic behavior (i) may evolve through, say, kin selection; 
(ii) may be shaped and maintained by contingencies of reinforcement 
arranged by those for whom the behavior works an advantage; or (iii) 
may be generated by cultures which, for example, induce individuals to 
suffer or die as heroes or martyrs. The contingencies of selection at the 
three levels are quite different are quite different, and the structural 
similarity does not attest to a common generative principle. (Skinner, 
1981, s. 503) 
Lastly, on a positive note, Barlow (1988, p. 21) informatively notes the lack of 
attention to the debate between group and individual selection6 in Skinner’s 
Consequences, similarly to Maynard-Smith’s criticism (3.2.1 above).  
                                            
6 I use and prefer the term intra-population selection, to refer to natural selection in the form of differential reproductive 
success between individual organisms, within a single biological population or species (illustratively, and typically, but not 
always), but ”individual selection” also makes similar sense.  
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3.2.3 Plotkin and Odling-Smee on interconnectedness between 
levels of selection 
Plotkin and Odling-Smee level two criticisms towards Consequences that I want to 
comment. Firstly, they stress “interconnectedness” between levels of selection, 
particularly between ontogenetic and phylogenetic: 
The interconnectedness of living systems may be complex, but 
interconnected they are. […] learning as a more subordinate process in 
the hierarchy can never be decoupled from the less subordinate 
processes in the hierarchy [biological evolution]. Learning of any and 
every sort must be primed by more fundamental processes, be they 
genetic or developmental (Plotkin & Odling-Smee, 1988).  
I agree that the interconnectedness of learning and biological evolution should be 
stressed. I attend to this interest by conveying that ontogenetic evolution (learning) 
extends phylogenetic evolution, most fundamentally through selection and shaping of 
primary reinforcers in phylogeny, but also in terms of specific dispositions towards 
imprinting, altered, prolonged, enhanced effects of contingencies by indistinct modes 
of learning, particularly memory, constraints on learning, and finally, co-functioning 
with other phylogenetic adaptations of significance to behavior under an operant 
regime. This is attended to particularly in sub-chapter 4.2, “Popperian organisms”, 
where I offer a synthesis between Skinner and Dennett, regarding what Dennett calls 
“Popperian creatures” (Dennett, 1995). 
Development (maturation) is not directly handled in operant psychology, but may 
indirectly grasped by realization of primary reinforcers and behavioral variation 
during the lifetime. The best example is puberty, adult sexuality, in which primary 
reinforcement by sexual contact is increased/realized, through maturation. On a side 
note, (Neo-Darwinian) radical behaviorism may give a much better account of 
“psycho-sexual stages” of personality development  (Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, 
Bem, & Nolem-Hoeksema, 2000, p. 456-457) than Freud’s own speculative account. 
Rather than so much broad expressions of sexuality, the three first stages, oral, anal 
and phallic, may simply be naturally selected growth and maturation processes, 
where primary reinforcement of learning to eat, disposing of feces and urine, 
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respectively, sequentially increase in strength, enabling correspondingly intense, 
sequential learning periods for these skills. 
Besides these considerations I find the criticism by Plotkin and Odling-Smee 
somewhat pessimistic. Operant conditioning, like natural selection, is a historical 
pattern of functional relations. These patterns potentially enable us to distill great 
explanatory power from otherwise chaotic fields of study, like biology and 
psychology. Plotkin and Odling-Smee seem to stress the complexity of things. 
Indeed, the world appears immensely complex, but only more so when defining 
causal, functional and historical patterns are ignored. 
One example of “complex interconnectedness”, and the other aspect of Plotkin & 
Odling-Smee’s criticism I want to cover, is actually an implicit reference to the 
Baldwin Effect: 
[…] circular causal sequences immediately become apparent in the 
form of “upward” and “downward” causation […] An example of the 
two-way causation in such a hierarchy occurs when genes are 
important and inevitable determiners of how and what is learned, but 
what is learned is often an important determiner of what genes are fed 
back (downward) into the gene pool (Plotkin & Odling-Smee, 1988, p. 
55). 
First of all, this criticism does not strike me as disqualifying Skinner’s levels of 
selection. It is merely a specification, but as presented by Plotkin and Odling-Smee, a 
hastened complication. Genes are “important and inevitable determiners of how and 
what is learned” by dictating some species-specific constraints on learning, and more, 
but most significantly in (proximately) determining a set of primary reinforcers, and 
their general properties, for example in terms of deprivation, as ultimately shaped by 
natural selection. Some individual differences in primary reinforcement, as a matter 
of mere intra-species genetic variation/naturally selected individual differences is also 
true (and not taken into account in Skinner’s old Darwinian view). However, the 
notion that “what is learned is often an important determiner of what genes are fed 
back into the gene-pool” is actually an implicit reference to the Baldwin Effect, at 
least as I interpret it, which I have dedicated a whole chapter to. While I agree with 
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Plotkin and Odling-Smee that the Baldwin Effect gives considerable insight into the 
“interconnectedness” of biological evolution and learning, I do not see how it negates 
Skinner’s proposal about selection in phylogeny, ontogeny and culture. Rather, I use 
the Baldwin Effect (see sub-chapter 3.4) to elaborate on and enhance Skinner’s 
theorization. While Skinner is perhaps overly simplistic, his critics here seem to see 
overly anxious to point out complexities. 
3.3 Primary and secondary reinforcement 
The concept of primary and secondary reinforcers plays a central, absolutely decisive 
role in my thesis, and I will here begin to explain how and why. 
In ontogeny consequences selecting behavior have a role equivalent to that of fitness 
in phylogeny. Any consequence can function as reinforcement, given that it increases 
the probability of a response reoccurring. The role of operant conditioning in 
ontogeny, as postulated by radical behaviorism, is equivalent to the role of natural 
selection in phylogeny, as postulated in evolutionary biology (Skinner, 1981). To 
build a successful, reliable, theoretically rigid notion of ontogenetic selection, special 
attention must be given to the overt selective mechanism proposed for that mode of 
selection. Differential reproductive success, fitness, the overt selective mechanism of 
phylogenetic evolution itself explains the very central workings of biological, 
phylogenetic evolution. Greater fitness means greater distribution of the heritable 
traits carried by the parent organism(s). The understanding of fitness promotes a 
clear, simple understanding of phylogenetic evolution and natural selection. 
Fitness is also a very clear, concrete and understandable concept:  The number of 
offspring an organism has, and, relative to the reproductive population it is part of, its 
relative number of offspring compared to other members of the population. Of course 
the calculation fitness ultimately extends over theoretically infinite amounts of 
generations: Counting the amount of children, grandchildren, grand grandchildren 
and so forth. Fitness can be best understood as the amount of offspring surviving to 
reproductive age, that a parent organism produces, the amount of resulting 
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grandchildren, grand-grandchildren, and so on, continuing into future generations. In 
each generation one will able to measure fitness by the amount of children, 
grandchildren, grand-grandchildren and so on, relative to the parent. 
Without (understanding of) this simple, overt selective mechanism, evolutionary 
biology may not have been as easily discernable, demonstrable, reliably replicable 
and ultimately not as reliably applied as a theory to describe the world, as Darwinian 
theory has proven to be. To establish a reliable theory of ontogenetic selection, 
identifying mechanisms and properties that fill much the same role as fitness benefits 
from being done.  
That property is reinforcement (Skinner, 1981, 1976). Naturally then, defining and 
understanding reinforcement as clearly and coherently as possible is important in 
achieving the above stated goal of creating and maintaining a clear, usable theory of 
ontogenetic selection. The definition most commonly used to define reinforcement is 
what I refer to as the functional definition: An event is reinforcing if it increases the 
likelihood or actual frequency of repetition of a response that it follows. If such an 
event amounts to an introduction of a stimulus or event it is, by definition, positive 
reinforcement (Skinner, 1976). 
A positive reinforcer strengthens any behavior that produces it: a glass 
of water is positively reinforcing when we are thirsty, and if we then 
draw and drink a glass of water, we are more likely to do so again on 
similar occasions. (Skinner, 1976, p. 51) 
Conversely, if the event amounts to a withdrawal of a stimulus it is, by definition, 
negative reinforcement. 
A negative reinforce strengthens any behavior that reduces or 
terminates it: when we take of a shoe that is pinching, the reduction in 
pressure is negatively reinforcing. (Skinner, 1976, p. 51) 
Challenging these definitions is not the point, as they are, again, by definition correct, 
as a matter of functional relationships between behavior and environment. However, 
while they are probably fine for most laboratorial, empirical work, that is, for most 
behavior analysis, they are, in my opinion, insufficient for a broader theory of 
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extensional ontogenetic evolution—ontogenetic evolution extending phylogenetic 
evolution, in the sense that operant conditioning is a naturally selected, phylogenetic 
adaptation. 
Just as we can readily identify and comprehend the role of number of offspring plays 
in transfer of frequency of a heritable trait to the next generation, we must know and 
be able to readily identify what reinforcement is, beyond its equivalent functional role 
of transferring greater frequency potential for a given behavioral response to the 
future. 
Knowing the structural properties that facilitate reinforcement is one potential 
solution. Particularly, knowing the functioning of the neurological mechanism(s) that 
facilitate operant conditioning can provide a non-tautological account of 
reinforcement. The problem is that the neurophysiology of operant conditioning is 
mostly unobservable, and probably largely theoretical, for now. Also, even if the 
covert, neurophysiological mechanism of reinforcement was used as definitional 
anchor, one still lacks an understanding of how some consequences become selecting 
consequences historically. The functional definition, apt for laboratorial situations 
where actual functional relations can be established, provides only a semi-
tautological or tautological account of how this happens, when experimental 
evidence, for various reasons, is not available. One of Chomsky’s more legitimate 
criticisms of Skinner’s attempt at accounting for verbal behavior was that the term 
reinforcement often amounts to a tautology (Chomsky, 1967), although, in my 
opinion, not to the dramatic extent that Chomsky proposes, and by no means 
rendering Skinner’s theory useless, as Skinner has support in the functional, 
experimental definition. Chomsky seems also to have forgotten that natural selection7 
is often subject to a very similar charge of tautology, without thus collapsing as a 
theory. 
                                            
7 Adaptive traits are selected on the basis of their differential reproductive value, but what makes an adaptation adaptive is 
per definition its reproductive value. 
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To establish how consequences become reinforcing—that is, selecting 
consequences—an account of the evolution of reinforcers themselves is needed. 
Operant conditioning is itself a phylogenetic adaptation, and accordingly some 
reinforcers have evolved by phylogenetic evolution. These reinforcers are by 
definition primary reinforcers. Primary reinforcers are unconditioned, non-contingent 
reinforcers. They are thus principally products of phylogenetic selection. 
It is commonly said that a thing is reinforcing because it feels, looks, 
sounds, smells, or tastes good, but from the point of view of 
evolutionary theory a susceptibility to reinforcement is due to its 
survival value [I suggest the term reproductive value, see sub-chapter 
3.2] and not to any associated feelings. (Skinner, 1976 p. 52) 
In the course of the lifetime of a person, however, lots of events and stimuli will be 
reinforcing, not all of them gaining their status from a history of natural selection. 
Those events and stimuli are by definition secondary reinforcers. To non-
tautologically define their status as reinforcers, we must trace their historical relation 
to primary reinforcers, from which they gain their power. While a history of natural 
selection non-tautologically accounts for the evolution of primary reinforcers within a 
given species (/reproductive population), the ontogenetic history of the individual 
member of a species extensionally accounts for the evolution of secondary 
reinforcers. In other words, it is beneficial to attend to the ontogenetic evolution of 
secondary reinforcers in the individual organism, extending the phylogenetic 
evolution of primary reinforcers in its species (ancestral populations). When this is 
done properly, non-tautological accounts of potentially all instances of reinforcement 
can be achieved. Thus the tautology-problem regarding reinforcement is essentially 
solved, at least on a theoretical level. 
For the purpose of understanding the co-control of behavior by phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic contingencies, and better understanding and conceptualizing ontogenetic 
evolution itself, a definition of reinforcement that forms an extensional bridge from 
phylogeny to ontogeny is needed. Operant conditioning itself is a phylogenetic 
adaptation or adaptations. It has itself been selected for its reproductive value. As 
with all ontogenetic adaptations (learning), operant conditioning results in lasting 
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changes in the phenotype beyond phylogenetic adaptation, within and limited to the 
lifetime of the organism (thus Lamarckism is in no way suggested). When a part of a 
species’ behavioral repertoire (for example related to particular musculature) 
becomes sensitive to consequences it produces, it will plausibly be open to all or most 
types of primary reinforcement that is evolved in the species (for example reaching 
out for an edible fruit using one’s hands). 
Phylogenetic versus ontogenetic maladaptivity in reinforcement 
On the one hand, each type of reinforcement is selected for its past reproductive value 
and thus the behavior of the organism should be understood in terms of adaptation to 
ancestral environments. For example, the availability of sugar in processed forms, in 
huge quantities compared to hominid ancestral environments, itself makes sugar a 
maladaptive reinforcer today. A lot of this maladaptivity transfers to ontogenetic 
selection of behavior: Seeking out and consuming sugar (candy, cakes, pastry, soda 
drinks and so on) is reinforced at a potentially alarming rate (resulting in some cases 
in such problems as obesity and type 2 diabetes). The maladaptivity continues as high 
sugar substances with low nutritional value provide stronger reinforcement than 
natural high sugar substances with less concentrated amounts, like fruits, berries and 
some vegetables. This amounts to differential reinforcement (a parallel to differential 
reproductive success in phylogeny). Furthermore, the very strength of reinforcement 
of substances with unnaturally high concentration of sugar steadily selects new ways 
to acquire such substances, for example using sugar in many dishes, eating dessert, 
having soft drinks with non-sugary meals, and so on. In short, when a primary 
reinforcer turns maladaptive, maladaptivity may tend to extend into ontogenetic 
maladaptation, resulting in potentially devastating effects. Whether a reinforcer is 
phylogenetically or ontogenetically maladaptive is a matter of some convention. If 
the current ontogenetic environment is rearranged so as to resemble the ancestral 
environments in which the primary reinforcer was initially phylogenetically shaped, 
then that primary reinforcer will essentially regain its adaptive status. Thus the 
evolutionary nutritionist will frequently refer to “stone age”-diets and environments. 
However, rearranging relevant aspects of “stone age”-environments today is possible 
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to some degree, and more importantly, is not necessarily the only way to arrange 
adaptive distribution of, say, sugar. 
Accordingly, whether the effect is truly and ultimately maladaptive in nature, relies 
largely on the arrangement of ontogenetic contingencies. It is possible to successfully 
remove or limit availability of maladaptive reinforcers from the environment. It is 
possible to arrange differential reinforcement in favor of natural high sugar 
substances (fruits, berries, etc.). And most importantly, it is possible to use the 
“maladaptive” reinforcer adaptively, a classic example being parents who will not let 
the child have desert before she has finished the more nutritional main meal, dinner. 
It is still possible to shape a host of functional, adaptive behavioral repertoires using 
the “maladaptive” reinforcer. Take for example a child with autism being taught to 
speak with small bits of chocolate, or tokens, which can eventually be traded into 
candy rewards. The white sugar-rewards are not very healthy in themselves, but the 
repertoires they are used to shape can make the difference between an able and a 
disabled, underdeveloped individual. 
The crucial point here is that ontogenetic extensional adaptation ensures the 
possibility of fostering adaptive repertoires based on maladaptive reinforcement. 
Processed, high sugar food is unhealthy food, but it nevertheless frequently shapes 
adaptive repertoires. For example, a working man who is fond of chocolate and 
sweets, eating all too much of it, may nevertheless be partly reinforced by these in his 
work, as work is exchanged for money, and money is exchanged for these unhealthy, 
but reinforcing edibles. In this example, maladaptive primary reinforcers give 
strength to a secondary reinforcer, money8. 
Maximum maladaptivity is only reached when maladaptive reinforcers (in isolated 
terms) are used to shape maladaptive behavior (also in isolated terms). The heroine 
abuser is a perfect example. His behavior is shaped by a toxic substance that bypasses 
                                            
8Actually money may partly be a primary reinforcer, depending on whether genetic dispositions to be reinforced by token 
rewards has evolved in humans. For the sake of simplicity I am assuming that money is principally a secondary reinforcer. 
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natural means of reinforcement, and commonly learns to new ways to steal, lye and 
cheat and ultimately has his life destroyed, as a result. What is seldom thought of is 
that a government could use that, or similar, maladaptive reinforcers to shape 
adaptive behaviors in the addict, like maintaining a day job, basic self-healthcare and 
a home (Iguchi, Stitzer, Bigelow, & Liebson, 1988 describes a similar study where 
methadone was used to reinforce abstinence from unauthorized drug use, contingent 
upon submitting urines testing negative for illicit substances.) 
In today’s society the heroine dealer shapes the behavior of the heroine addict 
instead. There is seldom any differential reinforcement of comparable strength 
available to the addict (lest he has a social network of tremendous abundant 
resources), and thus his dysfunctional lifestyle persists. Note that I am not making 
normative suggestions here (i.e. e., suggestion for social reform). I am certainly no 
advocate of governments using drug-reinforcers to control the behavior of its 
citizens—rather I am engaging in hypothetical problem solving in a local and very 
special circumstance. The point is to illustrate the difference between phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic maladaptivity in reinforcement. Even a vile reinforcer like heroine 
can be used to shape the repertoires of a model citizen (actually it would probably 
extremely effective). Nonetheless, again, without moving into normative territory, the 
goal of any society would typically be to use adaptive reinforcers to shape adaptive 
behavior. That would imply that the behavior analyst should use fruits and berries, if 
possible, rather than candy and chocolate, when for example shaping a verbal 
repertoire in a child with autism, although the choice would be of lesser priority in 
such a task. 
Reinforcement as phylogenetic adaptation 
Classical conditioning gives the organism a capacity to acquire some new adaptive 
repertoires during its lifetime: A response can apply to new stimuli for which it was 
not originally phylogenetically selected. 
However, it is weak compared to the awesome adaptive power that results when 
contact with a vital resource selects the preceding response from a pool of (random) 
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behavioral variation. Not only are responses that are useless in a novel environment 
weeded away. Entirely new responses, adapted to current, not ancestral, 
environments that reliably lead to vital resources are established during the lifetime of 
the organism. 
To increasingly complex organisms and environments, however, primary 
reinforcement does not hold. There are intermediate goals, chains of responses 
necessary to reach the resources associated with reproductive success. I am tempted 
to say that there is an increase in the logical complexity involved in acquisition of 
vital resources. Secondary reinforcement, as I prefer to define it, is any selecting 
consequence that has acquired its status (“power”) by some logical relation to a 
primary reinforcer, during the lifetime of an organism. Secondary reinforcers have 
two defining characteristics then: They evolve during the lifetime (in contrast primary 
reinforcers that appear during the lifetime of an organism rather “develop” as a matter 
of maturation, which is more heavily phylo-/genetically governed: The obvious 
example is adult sexuality, which develops during puberty in humans). I use the term 
evolve deliberately, to denote to evolution. The evolution of secondary reinforcers is a 
part of general ontogenetic evolution, but the principal ontogenetic evolution is 
selection by consequences—reinforcement in the case of ontogeny—as described by 
Skinner (1981). Secondary reinforcers gain their status and strength through some 
manner of logical connection to primary reinforcement, for example through classical 
conditioning. 
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Subchapter summary 
The important basic premise that has been established in this chapter is a defense 
against the tautology-problem related to reinforcement. Although there are many 
possibilities (some good, some bad) for anchoring reinforcement non-
tautologically—neurophysiology (brain mechanisms corresponding to 
reinforcement), mentalist hedonism (pain and pleasure) and common sense (reward 
and punishment)—I opt for anchoring the definition in fitness and phylogenetic 
evolution. Skinner already did this for primary reinforcers, by noting that they acquire 
their power from natural selection (Skinner, 1976, 1981).  
This is achieved by postulating an ontogenetic evolution of secondary reinforcers, 
extending the phylogenetic evolution of primary reinforcers. 
To summarize, two intermediate goals towards seamless understanding of the relation 
between phylogenetic and ontogenetic contingencies is achieved in this chapter: (1) A 
non-tautological definition of potentially all selecting consequences (reinforcement) 
in phylogeny, and in the same vein (2) a method of tracing the complete evolution of 
secondary reinforcers, from their ontogenetic evolutionary history, back to primary 
reinforcement, and from primary reinforcement back to their natural selection in the 
phylogeny.  
Fitness,	  reproductive	  success,	  initially	  selects	  traits	  and	  behaviors	  adapted	  to	  environments	  resembling	  past,	  ancestral	  environments	  
Primary	  reinforcement:	  Naturally	  selected	  susceptibility	  to	  strenghtening	  of	  behavioral	  repertoires	  that	  precede	  events	  and	  stimuli	  associated	  with	  relatiively	  stable	  historical,	  reproductive	  value	  
Secondary	  reinforcement:	  Environmental	  cues,	  events	  gaining	  reinforcing	  strength	  through	  various	  logical	  associations	  with	  primary	  reinforcement	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The key is primary reinforcement. Part of my thesis is that all reinforcement can be 
traceable to a relation, through primary reinforcement, and ultimately to natural 
selection (fitness). In other words, all selecting consequences should potentially be 
shown to have a logical relation to how it relates to historical fitness. For example, 
how does riding a bike, steering a helicopter or learning to play guitar relate to 
primary reinforcement and thus back to historical, ancestral reproductive value? 
Presumably chains of secondary reinforcers leads to a smaller pool of, or a single, 
primary reinforcer(s), typically more closely associated with reproductive value. The 
logical relation between these chains built during ontogeny, finally going back to 
primary reinforcement, which has in turn shaped in the evolutionary history of the 
species, makes for a seamless, extensional understanding of the relationship between 
phylogeny and ontogeny. I urge the reader not to confuse this logical relation between 
fitness and reinforcement with the idea that all reinforcement is necessarily adaptive 
or promotes fitness—reinforcement is related to ancestral, historically stable 
reproductive value, but not all behavior that is reinforced is adaptive (ontogenetic 
maladaptation), nor are all primary reinforcers adaptive in the contemporary 
environment (phylogenetic maladaptation). 
3.4 The significance of learning in phylogenetic evolution—
the Baldwin Effect 
In the preceding chapter I established a non-tautological definition of reinforcement 
especially for theoretical purposes, which rests on natural selection of primary 
reinforcers. I also established what can be illustrated as “an evolving tree” of 
secondary reinforcers during the lifetime of the organism. 
Dennett summarizes the Baldwin effect as follows: 
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What Baldwin discovered was that creatures capable of “reinforcement 
learning” not only do better individually than creatures that are 
entirely “hard wired”; their species will evolve faster because of its 
greater capacity to discover design improvements in the neighborhood. 
This is not how Baldwin described the effect he proposed. His 
temperament was the farthest thing from behaviorism. (Dennett, 1995, 
p. 79) 
Dennett seems to find behaviorism well suited to account for the Baldwin Effect (BE) 
for the occasion. However his introductory account of it is in my view unsatisfactory 
and does not capture the essence and explanatory power and theoretical simplicity of 
BE. Dennett describes BE as a process by which organisms can benefit from being 
close to a “Good Trick” (Dennett, 1995), rather than possessing it. “Good Trick” is 
Dennett’s favored term for adaptations. I think it is better to describe the Baldwin 
Effect in terms of not only discoverability of adaptations, but realization, and to what 
degree potential adaptations are translatable into actual adaptations. A potential 
phylogenetic adaptation may be useless to the infant phenotype and also the maturing 
phenotype beyond infancy. Lets say for example some members of our pre-bipedal 
hominid ancestors had a mutation which gave them musculature that enabled them to 
stand erect for short amounts of time. If standing erect was able to come under 
operant control, say, within the very first generations of that mutation, then that 
mutation could potentially become instantly adaptive, also within the very first 
generations. Standing erect in itself would be next to useless, but if standing erect 
would occasionally scare away predators, enable dominance within the tribe, enable 
reaching for fruits—all possible consequences that could plausibly appear by chance 
and (per definition) be repeated more readily once reinforced—. Within a generation 
standing erect could be shaped from “next to useless” into a powerful multi-
adaptation (naturally selected but realized through operant conditioning), depending 
on how many operant classes (types of reinforcing consequences) the behavior was a 
part of (I have mentioned reinforcement such as food stuffs, dominance, scaring away 
predators). The result, of course, would be greater fitness for members that 1) had the 
genetic mutation and 2) were disposed to have the traits and behaviors enabled by 
that genetic mutation come under operant control. 
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First cycle 
As members with the standing erect-mutation would have greater fitness, there would 
be greater frequency of that mutation in future generations of the population. Now, if 
social learning (i.e. e., imitation, modeling, observation) is also evolved in the 
population, various ontogenetically adaptive practices involving standing erect could 
spread in the population, with less dependence on the actual operant contingencies 
that originally selected the practices. 
I have now described the first level or cycle of the Baldwin Effect. Here natural 
selection is enabled to pick up—select—a potential phylogenetic adaptation. What 
makes phylogenetic adaptations like the one in the example adaptive is ability to 
learn to use them and operant learning is powerful, because it includes a newly 
evolved trait or uncommitted pool of behavioral variation in potentially very many 
operant classes, each tending to lead to historically stable adaptive goals (food, 
shelter, reproduction, and so on). 
Second cycle 
In the second cycle of the Baldwin Effect there is selection for innate repertoires or as 
I personally prefer to say, pre-learned repertoires, replacing the costly learning curve 
for acquiring learned repertoires: Lets say that many phylogenetic potential 
adaptations require a long period of learning to become functional and thereby actual 
adaptations. If many adaptations take this form then the organism will be preoccupied 
with long learning periods, throughout life but perhaps typically in the early parts of 
the lifecycle (even perhaps leading to “long childhoods”, such as is indeed the case 
with humans). For one, this leads to relatively long periods where adaptations are 
partly or wholly ineffective. Secondly, the organism has less time and resources 
directed at novel ontogenetic adaptations, instead being preoccupied with having 
potential phylogenetic adaptations shaped into actual adaptations. 
This presumably opens the population to selection for pre-learned repertoires—
further phylogenetic shaping of the initial potential phylogenetic adaptations. The 
result is that organisms eventually are born with adaptations that require lesser 
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subsequent ontogenetic shaping. In other words, there is phylogenetic selection for 
adaptations that require less learning time to become functional. 
The most essential feature of the Baldwin Effect is thus that ontogenetic adaptation 
guides the shaping of phylogenetic adaptations. An organism requiring only a short 
learning period to utilize a given phylogenetic adaptation has better potential fitness 
than one requiring a long learning period. In light of the Baldwin Effect we can thus 
hypothesize that many “instinctive”, innate—pre-learned—repertoires of 
contemporary species and populations were once learned repertoires in their 
respective ancestral populations. The nest building of birds that cannot possibly have 
been due to learning, operant or otherwise, may have been learned in more primitive 
forms in ancestral bird populations. In the nest building of some contemporary bird 
populations operant conditioning may play only a small role. For example, some 
consequences that are produced in the nest building process may still serve to keep 
the repertoire in check, even occasionally producing more effective methods of 
gathering, stacking and preparing materials. There is no reason why there should be 
selection for entirely fixed repertoires that cannot still be enhanced by learning. There 
are no plausible contingencies of fitness that would provide such selection. Rather 
most pre-learned repertoires will benefit from keeping an open end towards further 
optimization by learning. This is especially true for phylogenetic adaptations that 
depart from their original, past adaptive function and take on new functional roles. 
What is important to establish is that the Baldwin Effect provides theoretical 
simplicity and enhanced explanatory power to traditional adaptationism. It is not an 
unnecessary layer of explanation on top of traditional Darwinism. Neither does it 
replace Darwinism in any way, since it does not breach its original principles in any 
way. I also think that an emphasis on operant conditioning enhances the plausibility 
of the Baldwin Effect. When there is a flexible connection between fixed 
consequences (primary reinforcement) that are more or less securely linked to 
phylogenetic history of greater fitness and new behavioral disposition that arise from 
genetic mutation (for example the ability to stand tall), the possibility for adaptive 
outcome is greatly enhanced. The Baldwin Effect and operant conditioning provide a 
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sort of complementary theoretical coherency to each other. One argument for the 
basic and continued importance of operant conditioning in many or most advanced 
species is that it played (and continues to play) an important role in facilitating the 
implementation of many potential phylogenetic adaptations. It is said that most 
genetic mutations are “harmful”—maladaptive—to the organism. With the Baldwin 
Effect presumably most still are, but far less than if organisms somehow had to be 
born with instantly adaptive traits. I think a minority of phylogenetic adaptations has 
a history of instant adaptation. Mostly those phylogenetic adaptations that appear as 
part of a subsequent phylogenetic shaping of traits are plausibly instantly adaptive—
where there is a phylogenetic, rather than ontogenetic, history of adaptation. I 
imagine ontogenetic adaptation must typically be in place to “nurture” a “hopeful” 
genetic mutation, especially where the genetic mutation does not build on top of a 
history of phylogenetic adaptations involving earlier genetic mutations. 
3.4.2 Baldwinian Selection for Innate, Pre-Learned Repertoires 
Often the Baldwin Effect will presumably result in phylogenetic shaping of relatively 
complex pre-learned repertoires. Rather than developing as a blank slate of unshaped, 
behavior-general neurology, the infant brain will come with many advanced 
behavioral dispositions (considering the long evolutionary history of our species). 
Some of this neurology may be more or less fixed, while some of it may combine 
pre-disposition with plasticity. The plasticity is likely linked to common modes of 
learning: Classical conditioning, operant conditioning, imprinting, etc. At least that is 
a hypothesis that I would like to promote. I think the possibility that ontogenetic 
adaptation builds on phylogenetic adaptation is not only very plausible in light of the 
Baldwin effect, but is also a good working hypothesis for understanding how learning 
and biological evolution co-work. Learning is too often seen as opposed to “nativity” 
or innateness, or alternatively one proposes “combination” of learning and innate 
“structure” and “development”. This is a typically structuralist view, which I think is 
unfruitful—it is structuralist because “biology” is identified with the “organism’s 
structure”, while learning is identified with the “environment”. This is actually not 
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only unfruitful, but utterly false. Learning is an organism-environment relation and 
cannot be identified with the environment as cut off from the organism. 
The rule, rather than the exception, I think, is that learning is crucial for realization 
and development of pre-learned, innate repertoires. Learning seldom takes on a role 
that is neatly isolated from innate, pre-learned repertoires. Recall my definition 
ontogenetic adaptation—learning—as simply lasting adaptive changes to organism’s 
physiology based on contact with the environment during ontogeny (adaptation is 
here defined broadly as adjusting to or responding to the environment. Maladaptive 
or neutral repertoires can indeed also be learned). The world simply is not cut into 
naïve and ultimately false structuralist categories. 
3.4.3 Baldwinian Selection for New Primary Reinforcers 
I now turn to what I think is a most important potential role for Baldwinian selection. 
As I have mentioned, in the second cycle or stage of the Baldwin Effect there is 
selection for decreased cost in learning. Learning is thus typically replaced with more 
elaborate pre-learned repertoires, but, importantly, it can also be replaced with more 
effective learning. One way in which learning can be made far more effective is if 
new types of reinforcement evolve that are associated with already established forms 
of primary reinforcement. 
An organism which behaviors are reinforced by consequences involving nutritious 
food consumption benefits from learning new ways to find and consume such food. 
However, having to stumble into nutritious food to learn new ways to acquire it can 
turn out to be a slow and costly learning curve. When a genetic mutation makes 
behaviors associated with finding food themselves reinforcing (for example modes of 
hunting and gathering behavior) the organism can minimize the learning curve. The 
second cycle of the Baldwin Effect does not necessarily need to constitute pre-
learnedness, even though it is certainly also beneficial. It can also constitute more 
effective and faster learning. A typical cue for phylogenetic selection of primary 
reinforcers can be hitherto conditioned reinforcers (but it is in the nature of non-
Lamarckian phylogenetic evolution that such connections are loose, anyway). 
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Organisms that engage in a costly learning curve of classical conditioning for 
acquiring appropriate conditioned reinforcers will tend to have lower fitness than 
organisms that have pre-learned such reinforcers. Of course a pre-learned reinforcer 
is per definition a primary reinforcer. Thus the result is that organisms may acquire a 
large set of associated primary reinforcers through phylogenetic evolution. 
When human children play, they may be actually reinforced by behavior associated 
with more directly adaptive types of reinforcement. They acquire many adaptive 
repertoires, or prerequisites of adaptive repertoires, without doing what adults 
consider useful (i.e. e. functional, adaptive) work. Of course children also take many 
cues from their cultural community, for example through imitation. 
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4. A modern synthesis for ontogeny 
This chapter draws upon and is inspired by Cleaveland’s article (Beyond trial-and-
error in a selectionist psychology, 2002) on distinguishing between codical and 
material units in ontogenetic selection. Cleaveland distinguishes between overt 
behavioral responses and associations; the latter of which is what is actually subject 
to strengthening by ontogenetic selection (2002). 
I have now established an understanding and definition of reinforcement, which 
theoretically traces any reinforcer logically back to its phylogenetic origin (3.3) and 
provided a synthesis between modern evolutionary biology and radical behaviorism, 
with respect to intra-population selection, as opposed to group selection, and an 
understanding of how individual genetic differences play a central role, both as the 
source of variation in the modern view of natural selection, and as a vital source in 
individual behavior (3.2). I’ve broken down Skinner’s assignment of ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic contingencies to individual and species behavior respectively, and 
instead indicated a viewpoint where there is more of a seamless extension between 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic contingencies. 
However, modern evolutionary biology offers a very significant synthesis, which puts 
genes and phylogenetic contingencies in a systematic and explanatory 
complementary relation to each other: The modern evolutionary synthesis (Sterelny 
& Griffiths, 1999). Meanwhile psychology, at the level of ontogeny, has made little 
progress in defining how behavior and the organismic structure relate to each other. 
Skinner drew some informative sketches, distinguishing between the causal statuses 
of the organismic structure and the ontogenetic contingencies shaping it  (Skinner, 
1976). 
An organism behaves as it does because of its current structure, but 
most of this is out of reach of introspection. At the moment we must 
content ourselves, as the methodological behaviorist insists, with a 
person’s genetic and environmental histories. (Skinner, 1976, p. 19) 
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Skinner managed to depart from the everyday phenomenological perspective that our 
actions originate within us, that we do things because of how we feel, what we want 
and turn attention to the role of the environmental histories, first of all to the role of 
the environment in ontogeny, being a psychologist, but also, as we have seen, to the 
role of the environment in phylogeny (Skinner, 1966, 1981). 
What is reinforced? 
The replicator-interactor distinction in modern evolutionary biology illustrates a 
difference between the performance that is subject to selection—the interactor, a 
potentially adaptive trait—and the actual, selected, transferred component—the 
replicator(s), a gene, allele (a gene variant), or a set of genes. 
Replicators are things that are copied into the next generation: they 
form lineages of things with the same structure. Interactors (or 
vehicles) are entities that exist in each generation of a copying cycle 
and interact, more or less successfully, with the environment. (Sterelny 
& Griffiths, 1999, p. 55) 
Similarly for ontogeny, one may ask what is actually reinforced in operant behavior. 
Is it a behavior that is selected, strengthened, or is it actually a neurological 
association that has been strengthened and reinforced? 
Distinguishing between replicators and interactors in ontogeny implies that it is not 
the actual observable behavior that is reinforced, but an aggregate, an enabler or 
producer of behavior. It also then becomes more obvious that contingencies are not 
copied to an inner environment (though conceptually and analytically from a 
behavior analytic standpoint), because the replicative component is part of the 
contingency. The organism is changed by contingencies, but the contingencies are not 
copied or stored in the organism (Skinner, 1976; 1990). 
This enabler is the organismic structure in general, and the brain and central nervous 
system in particular, including mental states. This has the potential to define a 
systematic unit of behavior and thus contribute to a clarification of what is selected as 
distinguished from and in relation to the selecting consequence, something that 
further benefits anchoring and defining reinforcement and behavior reinforced. 
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 Brain as behavior replicator Brain as behaving (what the 
organism/brain does) 
Ontogeny Neurological, synaptic 
associations; associants 
(Cleaveland, 2002) 
Private contingencies and non-
private contingencies; 
remembering (itself an effect of 
contingencies but enables 
private re-arrangement of 
contingencies—similar to what 
Dennett calls “inner 
environment”) 
Phylogenetic parallel 
(illustratively important) 
Genes as replicators; genome 
as central replicator component 
Genome as part of the 
phenotype; genes as part of  
(read: Genome as phylogenetic 
adaptation) 
Legacy contingency Stimulus-organism-response 
(S-O-R) 
Discriminating stimulus-
response-reinforcing stimulus 
(SD-R-SR) 
Tabell 4-1 Ontogeny: Brain as behavior replicator versus brain as behaving 
4.2 Popperian organisms 
Dennett argues that humans are not merely Skinnerian creatures, but have evolved 
capacity for preselection of behavior (Dennett, 1995). He labels organisms that have 
this capacity for preselection Popperian organisms. He explains, 
Unlike the merely Skinnerian creatures, many of whom survive only 
because they make lucky first moves, Popperian creatures survive 
because they’re smart enough to make better-than-chance first moves. 
(Dennett, 1995, p. 375) 
I agree with Dennett that humans are indeed Popperian creatures. I hold, however, 
that Popperian organisms are a brand of Skinnerian organisms. They largely derive 
their Popperian capacities from the actual environment. It is unclear whether Dennett 
also holds that Popperian organisms are a brand of Skinnerian organisms, but judging 
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by his dismissiveness of Skinnerian theory (1995, p. 376), one should think not. 
However, he discusses whether pigeons were ever proven by behaviorists not to be 
Popperian (p. 376) (as if behaviorists were at any time trying to prove that the pigeon 
was “Skinnerian”). He also discusses whether a range of species may be considered 
purely Skinnerian (1995). 
Dennett also seems to underestimate the role of social learning and in the particular 
case of humans, verbal instruction. Human infants are rarely subject to unlucky first 
moves, as they are brought up in a teaching, corrective, verbal, and not to forget, 
protective community. Furthermore, if they were to make any “first moves”, no 
preselective capacity would be likely to save them. Human infants seem to rely 
heavily on care, guidance and instruction. Baldwinian selection, as I have noted, goes 
some way in explaining this: Human infants must tune and actualize a host of 
potential phylogenetic adaptations by subsequent ontogenetic adaptation. 
Baldwinian selection of primary reinforcers also favors an outcome that is similar to 
preselective capacity, but simpler: By phylogenetic evolution stimuli that are 
associated with other primary reinforcement and punishment eventually themselves 
become primary reinforcers and punishers (by a process which slightly resembles the 
evolution of secondary reinforcers in ontogeny). So a child will not have to suffer the 
punishment of falling down hills or stairs. The sight of heights will already punish it. 
To the extent that this constitutes preselection, it takes place in phylogeny and 
extends to ontogeny as a matter of operant conditioning, which is indeed successful 
on the first trial. 
Though these are good alternative explanations, and I think sometimes better 
explanations than Popperian preselection (in the example of the infant’s reaction to 
heights), I do agree with Dennett on important aspects. The question is not whether 
humans can do selective trials on the environment privately and covertly—they can, 
obviously—but, first of all, which environment the trials are performed upon. 
Secondly, a rhetorical question, where do behaviors, whether a matter of thinking or 
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actual operation, perform their ultimate function? Has thinking ultimately evolved to 
perform behaviors on an inner environment, or the actual environment? 
I think it is safe to say that thinking, even in humans, is most of all a premeditative 
measure for acting upon the actual environment. Functions like memory may allow 
us to act upon properties of the environment that are no longer present. A child may 
remember touching a hot stove, or the instruction not do so, and in both cases avoid 
future accidental encounters with the stove. Though memory allows the effect of 
contingencies to be prolonged, and for us to operate silently upon features of the 
environment (for example re-experience a prior encounter) no longer present, the 
effective contingencies stem from the real environment, not an inner environment. 
Memorization, a slightly indistinct mode of learning, coincides with operant 
conditioning—both memory and the capacity of operant conditioning are of course 
phylogenetic adaptations. The resulting behavior can thus be explained in terms of 
natural selection and operant conditioning. 
Dennett envisages a library of information constituting our “inner environment”. The 
fact that we so easily forget features of the environment suggests rather that our 
remembering is selective—selected to be precise, under an operant regime. We 
remember things that are useful, or functional to remember, and the best measure of 
functionality we have is reinforcement. It may of course be that we have yet another 
preselective capacity of selective remembering, but then we are approaching a 
leaking regress which rapidly adds unnecessary theoretical complexity. 
While I do not challenge the complexity of human behavior, and the complexity of 
the structure proximately causing those behaviors, I do challenge that it should have 
to be matched with an “equivalent” theoretical complexity. It seems to be the 
tendency that since human behavior is so complex it has to be matched with complex 
theory. Must we really propose an inner environment to explain human behavior? 
Does memory constitute an inner environment; is it a copy of the actual environment? 
If it is a copy of anything, it is a copy of the initial structural changes caused by 
ontogenetic contingencies (thus memory is indeed a type of ontogenetic 
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adaptation/learning). Do those structural changes necessarily have to be copied? Is it 
not plausible that a preservation of the initial structural change will do? When the 
person or organism remembers, it is then a matter of re-behaving—re-activation of 
that changed structure. Accordingly, when something is forgotten it is (proximately) 
because those structural changes having waned, that is, lost their initial composure, 
for example by lack of strengthening (reinforcement) (ultimate/private cause). 
We are accordingly Popperian organisms controlled by the actual environment, not 
by an inner environment, though exactly what constitutes an “inner environment” is 
somewhat uncertain. It is absolutely clear that humans internalize: All ontogenetic 
adaptation, including memory and reinforcement, is per definition internalization—by 
the structural change resulting from contingencies. Memories resemble earlier 
experience/behavior, earlier contact with the environment. If the initial 
experience/behavior is a presentation of the environment, the memorization of that 
experience is a re-presentation. Memorization is thus a matter of re-behaving in the 
absence of the events and stimuli that caused the initial experience/behavior. 
Phylogenetic evolution can only stably select for innate conception of equivalently 
stable, recurring features of the environment, like for example basic physics, isolation 
of distinct events and stimuli, and some anatomical features of ancestral phenotypes. 
The question of whether we operate upon an internal environment is not of great 
importance, at least not to my thesis. The important point is that any internal 
environment does not replace the actual environment. To be able to operate upon 
internalized features of the environment constitutes a natural and plausible 
phylogenetic evolution of operant conditioning. However, the principal source of 
contingencies remains in the actual environment. When we learn new skills we tend 
to operate upon the actual environment, whether it is learning to row or riding a 
bicycle. We are subject to contingencies in the actual environment. If we already had 
internalized the environment and its contingencies, we could very well learn to ride 
bicycles, control helicopters, do break dancing and making elaborate dishes by 
simply sitting passively and thinking about it. It is appropriate to ask whether 
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phylogenetic evolution would favor copying of the actual environment to an inner 
environment, when the actual environment is readily available—always. Novel 
contingencies of the environment have to be “copied” during ontogeny. That they 
should have to be ineffective until copied to an inner environment, where only then 
they become effective is not likely. Advancement of the memory capacities of a 
species is more likely to constitute a prolonged, and thus potentially more adaptive 
and functional, effect of the contingencies—phylogenetic adaptation that facilitates 
more advanced memory coincides with an operant regime. Rather than internalizing 
the contingencies, what happens is that the effects of the contingencies are preserved 
more systematically and over a longer time span. 
Lets say a person vividly remembers a car-crash in which he was involved. Whenever 
he drives under similar conditions (discriminating stimuli) he recalls this event. He 
thinks about this event, recalling what went wrong, how he lost control of the car on 
an icy lane, for example. He recalls his responses but changes some features. In the 
silent trial a discriminating stimuli prompts an appropriate response based on his 
experience. He sees the icy parts of the road, but this time around, in the silent trial, 
he slows down, and approaches the icy lane with due caution. His silent trial is 
successful (and thus privately, negatively reinforcing). Is it right to say that the 
contingencies of the driving accident are copied to his inner environment, or that the 
effect of those contingencies are enhanced by naturally selected memory capacity? 
In a way the contingencies are “copied”, but only as a matter of the silent trial—
remembering, re-experiencing the event, with some variation in response (stopping 
the car in response to the icy parts of the road). Thus, again, it is more precise and 
correct to say that the silent re-behaving—thinking about, remembering the event—
constitutes private contingencies. Thus the contingencies have been reproduced as a 
matter of behaving (remembering, thinking), not copied to or stored in an inner 
environment. 
Being a Popperian creature does not necessarily mean self-sufficiency in very early 
stages of the lifetime—humans, and many other animals, are after all raised for self-
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sufficiency. Humans especially, with our long childhood, do not become fairly self-
sufficient operators upon the environment until relatively long into ontogeny. As far 
as preselected self-sufficiency goes, it is afforded by natural selection, by evolution of 
appropriate responses to stimuli and events that have appeared fairly stably in parts of 
phylogeny. Baldwinian selection ensures that more such events and stimuli that are 
related to fitness do appear stably during phylogeny (for example being reinforced by 
hunting and exploration as opposed to just finding and eating food). 
Being a Popperian creature does mean that one can act silently upon features of the 
environment one has been subject to during ontogeny and thus perform some 
amazingly adaptive pre-selection of responses prior to features of the environment 
that resemble contingencies that one has previously been subjected to, either by direct 
experience, imitation, observation or verbal and non-verbal instruction. Considering 
that we may be able to do potentially infinite amounts of successive silent trials, 
successively building upon each other, there is quite a distinction between the 
Popperian and simpler “Skinnerian” (Dennett, 1995) organism—all fairly compatible 
with the radical behaviorist (i.e. e., Skinnerian) framework. 
The main points proposed in this sub-chapter are that an “internal environment” does 
not replace the actual (ontogenetic) environment and that we are indeed Popperian 
organisms, as proposed by Dennett. However, Popperian organisms are essentially 
advanced Skinnerian organisms, fitting more or less seamlessly into the framework of 
operant psychology and more broadly, radical behaviorism. 
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5. Seamless causal relationship between 
biological evolution and culture 
5.1 Culture 
It is possible to give a good account of the seamless extension of ontogeny from 
phylogeny in terms of compatible causal categories. Radical behaviorism is already 
strongly disposed towards this possibility. All I have done so far is to explore that 
possibility, make some suggestion for further use and development and try to sort out 
some associated problems. With regards to pure philosophy of science the implication 
is initially a more seamless link between psychology (of learning) and (evolutionary) 
biology. Accounting for culture includes further linkage with anthropology, as 
Skinner briefly outlines in “Consequences” (1981). What I envisage is even more 
broadly a breakdown of the common barrier between the social (and even humanist) 
sciences and natural sciences. Psychology is the key because it is properly the science 
of the ontogeny of the individual organism in relation to the social and nonsocial 
environment. In this regard behaviorism is more exemplary than necessary. For 
psychology to achieve this, ontogenetic adaptation, learning, almost certainly needs 
to be taken seriously. Psychology cannot be a discipline, which adds nothing to its 
biological base sciences but talk of mind. Mental states can be studied with great 
success in the fields of neurology, genetics, and evolutionary biology, without ever 
having to mention the word “psychology”. A type of ultimate causation should be 
peculiar to psychology, and even if we grant mental states the most generous causal 
status that natural science can possibly afford, they are not ultimate causes of 
behavior. Mental states simply are not ultimate causes in a world of approximate 
universal causation. 
Nature-nurture, or genes and environment, does not do us any favors in sorting out 
how culture relates to the ontogeny of the individual person or organism, but 
“environment” nevertheless clearly, but implicitly, includes culture, at least in the 
case of humans. This chapter is mainly about sorting out what culture is, in relation to 
ontogeny. Though I see great potential for behaviorism on that account, this is a part 
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where Skinner is less than clear, making only preliminary suggestions and some 
outright mistakes (1981). I will try to sort this out fairly completely. 
5.2 Defining Culture 
As I define culture, its minimum prerequisite is social learning. Thus I reject the 
notion that language somehow defines culture, though it certainly characterizes 
human culture. Culture is I contend, the transfer of learned responses (often but not 
always ontogenetic adaptations) within and between the generations of a population 
and also between populations. As these learned responses manifest in more than one 
organism, they may properly be identified as practices. A practice is a response that 
is transferred between organisms by social learning. A practice is also a behavioral 
equivalent to the more popular term meme, within roughly cognitivist co-evolutionary 
theory. While memes are typically held to reside in the “mind”, practices are readily 
identifiable as observable behavior. A practical translation of meme may be silent 
trials—thinking—associated with a given practice, or actual stored information that 
can potentially be used to communicate, teach or otherwise transmit a practice: An 
actual tool, a blueprint for a tool, a recipe for soup, a videotaped dancing lesson, a 
song on a compact disc, etc. I believe that we can certainly internalize even detailed 
experiences with a practice and this may potentially be identified as a meme, but I 
think it is better to conceptualize it as some defining logical properties of a practice, 
which we recall significantly by behaving in ways we did when we originally were 
exposed to that practice. 
5.3 Kin-Selection versus cultural selection of altruistic 
behavior 
One of the successes of the operant psychological account of culture is that 
maladaptation is easily accounted for. A cultural group may reinforce maladaptive 
behaviors in individuals of the group in favor of the welfare of other group members. 
Examples are a group’s promotion of ideas like heroism, martyrdom, patriotism and 
self-sacrifice for greater good to certain individuals of the group, or group interests. 
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Evolutionary biology already has a good theory of persistent maladaptive behavior of 
the individual at the benefit of the group: Kin-selection. An organism has more genes 
in common with relatively related organisms than with relatively unrelated organisms 
of lesser kinship. Thus the organism will transfer its genes to the next generation, not 
only by itself reproducing, but also through the reproduction of its kin. Accordingly 
organisms, including humans, tend to bestow resources on other persons according to 
closeness of kinship (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999): One’s own children, children of 
female sibling (greater certainty of kinship), children of male sibling, and close kin in 
general, tribe, nation, historically reproductively isolated population (race), species. It 
is all a matter of relative kinship the way I see it and understand kin selection. 
Nuclear family is favored over extended family, which again is favored over local 
community or tribe, which again is favored over national, ethnic, racial in-group in 
general, which again is favored over out-groups as such, which again is favored over 
other non-human species. 
Old Darwinian operant psychology sees kin-selection as a matter of “species 
behavior” (Skinner, 1981; 1990). I suggest instead that kin-selection extends to 
ontogenetic contingencies in the form of moderation of primary reinforcers. We are 
thus more reinforced by bestowing resources on close kin as opposed to lesser kin. A 
mother’s behavior of bestowing resources upon her child—feeding it, may be 
extraordinarily reinforced, which enables her to more effectively learn new ways to 
support the child. Recall that primary reinforcement is defined in relation to historical 
fitness. 
I do not know what kind of behavior Skinner attributed kin-selection to in ontogeny. 
Perhaps a respondent repertoire or a simple genetic endowment, which could readily 
be modified by contingencies of reinforcement. This is an interesting theory which 
does not seem implausible at all, but still I would like to suggest the possibility that 
kin-selection is in fact embedded in primary reinforcement. Either way, since genes 
themselves are unobservable to organisms, some observable phenotypic features 
identifying kin are likely learned by a process of imprinting, or similar. 
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5.4 Cultural Evolution 
Cultural evolution seems to me to emerge as a very realistic, plausible phenomenon, 
in light of operant psychology. When Skinner’s original, slightly misplaced parallel 
to phylogenetic group selection and species-selection, focusing on all of the practices 
in cultures, as opposed to practices fairly independent of enclosing cultures, operant 
culture theory starts to make sense too. Practices spread as a function of being 
reinforcing to learn, practice (maintain) and transmit (either by explicit teaching, 
imitation, simple verbal, written or otherwise symbolic rule-governance or 
observation). Explicit teaching distinguishes itself among others in that the teacher 
(for example parent, tutor or peer) is reinforced by the resulting behavior shown in 
the learner and that contingencies, rules, imitational and observational routines are 
explicitly arranged for the learner. To put it simply, we often learn from people who 
are not engaging in any form of explicit teaching directed at us. It may be someone 
we see doing their own routine, without much regard for our observation of them. 
The practices rely on being reinforcing to cultural members for spreading, in contrast 
to memetic theory, where memes. They will thus tend to be adaptive but need not to 
be. It is important to point out that cultural evolution follows as a major extension of 
the “problem solving” engaged in by natural selection. Like I have noted earlier, 
through operant conditioning, culture enables shaping of behavioral repertoires, 
means adapted to the contemporary social and nonsocial environment, meanwhile 
reaching adaptive goals of fairly stable historical reproductive value (primary 
reinforcement). Accordingly, the alpha male of the modern society is a CEO or a rock 
star, rather than a tribe chieftain (a hypothetical tribe chieftain mental module, as 
could be proposed as a parody of cognitivist evolutionary psychology, would 
probably be seriously maladaptive, unless flexibly applying some goals which can 
extract suitable behaviors from the contemporary environment, similar to operant 
conditioning). 
Culture is absolutely a product of natural selection, first significantly through the 
evolution of operant conditioning and finally through imitation, observation, 
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modeling, and partly verbal instruction, etc. (constituting the transfer of behavioral 
variation from organism to organism). Recounting Skinner: 
Ultimately, of course, it [the role of operant conditioning in ontogeny 
and culture] is all a matter of natural selection, since operant 
conditioning is an evolved process, of which cultural practices are 
special applications. (Skinner, 1981, p. 502) 
Practices mutate as a matter of becoming part of the repertoire, and thus behavioral 
variation, of new individuals. Recombination of behavioral repertoires, as well as 
slight errors in transmission (for example in the teaching) of a practice is parallel to 
“mutation” (on the interactive, phenotypic level) in phylogenetic evolution. Practices 
may also combine with other practices or behavioral variation to form a synthesis, a 
slight parallel to sexual recombination. For example prototypic dancing may 
hypothetically have evolved, in a culture, independently from music and rhythm, but 
at some point formed a synthesis. Today, at least, it is uncommon to dance 
unaccompanied by rhythm and music. Music functions as a discriminating stimulus 
setting the occasion for dancing and tends to make it more reinforcing. 
Since cultural evolution, like phylogenetic evolution, spans across generations of 
organisms, it is also in a sense “phylogenetic”. I may actually have erred in 
exclusively using the term phylogenetic evolution for organic, Darwinian evolution 
of genetic transfer and inheritance, but I hope it will suffice to say that cultural 
evolution has both “vertical” and “horizontal” transfer, whereas Darwinian evolution 
is only vertical. Cultural spread to other living members in cultural in- and out-
groups, both younger and older, as well as subsequent generations (offspring, 
offspring of others).  Darwinian evolution works only vertically, and one-way: To 
subsequent generations of newborn offspring. Darwinian evolution does however 
have a horizontal equivalent, wherein a gene or set of genes may spread across (a) 
population(s), across geography, but not without already transferring vertically. 
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5.5 Cultural evolution is a creative process  
One of the most, if not the most, important reason for considering a cultural theory of 
operant selection is that it tells us why cultural evolution is a creative process. Some 
of the confidence behind sociobiological propositions that genes alone determine 
culture stems from the notion that natural selection is the only known non-intelligent 
creative process. 
Practices that are differentially reinforcing compared to other practices presumably 
spread faster, more consistently. The same behavioral variations that play a part in the 
operant learning of the individual make up a variation in cultural evolution. Some 
practices rely on individual differences, be they genetic or a matter of acquired, 
secondary reinforcers during the lifetime, thus there may be cultural practices that 
attract a certain segment of the population, like sports, hobbies and other interests. 
Memes fail to account for this well-known phenomenon because memetics fails to 
identify reinforcement (or in mental terms, the pleasure and pain of the bearer of the 
meme) as a selecting consequence in cultural evolution. Instead memetics is centered 
around the idea that memes, or ideas are parallel to an organismic, Darwinian 
evolution. The obvious difference is that organisms replicate on account on their 
survivability and ultimately reproductive means, while ideas are host to individuals 
who utilize ideas as part of a functional, adaptive repertoire. Thus memes will be 
measured, not merely by their own merits of reproductivity, but by their functional 
adaptive value to their host, and as I have hypothesized, reinforcement is the premier 
measurement of function in ontogeny. 
5.5.1 Creative cultural institutions 
Some cultural institutions represent creative processes of their own. The most 
admirable examples are natural science, through the hypothetic-deductive scientific 
method, and the capitalist free market. In the latter, enterprises that provide 
reinforcing goods and services to the largest mass of people are in return reinforced in 
proportion to that provision. Although all human cultures are evolutionary, some are 
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more consistent with the principles of creativity—the culture that blends 
conservatism, history and creative change, the renaissance culture.  
Rather than to view these creative cultural institutions as entirely unrelated processes 
of variation-selection-retention, they may be viewed as different expressions of 
cultural operant selection. In science, for example, the reinforcing consequence is 
refined notions of truth, verification or non-falsification (a mix between primary 
reinforcers and logically complex secondary reinforcers). In the market money, of 
course, or other exchange commodities, is the reinforcers. Money is a secondary 
reinforcer associated with anything it can reliably be exchanged for, and probably the 
most significant type of secondary reinforcer in modern society. 
It is my opinion that creative cultural institutions are all more general expressions of 
cultural operant selection. In science, for example, the reinforcing consequence is 
refined notions of truth (a mix between a primary reinforcer and secondary 
reinforcer), discovery, and perhaps most importantly association to application of 
gained knowledge (secondary reinforcement by association to anything from 
technological convenience to health benefits). 
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6. Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters I presented Skinner’s radical behaviorist perspective on the 
natural selection and operant conditioning as modes of selection in phylogeny and 
ontogeny respectively. I argued that Skinner subscribed to an older group selectionist 
view of Darwinism, which I considered to have influenced his theory of how 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic selection negatively. Rather than separate behavioral 
repertoires in terms of species behavior, shaped by natural selection, and individual 
behavior, shaped by operant conditioning, I argued for a perspective that 
acknowledges a multitude of phylogenetic adaptations relevant to human psychology. 
Meanwhile I sought to further illustrate the intimate connection between phylogenetic 
selection and learning, by discussing and examining the Baldwin Effect. 
I also emphasized that ontogenetic selection extends phylogeny, in the sense that 
primary and secondary reinforcement can both be logically linked to their 
phylogenetic history. In that sense all behavior shaped in ontogeny can be traced back 
to a relation to ancestral reproductive value, while still not making the mistake of 
naively explaining naturally selected behavior with reference to present adaptive 
value. 
In chapter 4 I took the argument for a less artificial distinction between what 
behavioral repertoires are shaped phylogenetically and ontogenetically further, by 
arguing that operant conditioning is indeed, like Dennett (1995) suggests, merely one 
of many adaptations, but that it is an adaptation of unequal importance, due to its 
special function-estimating role in ontogeny, similar to that of fitness in phylogeny, 
and to its historical adaptive significance.  
Meanwhile, and in a related manner, distinguishing between interactors and 
replicators in ontogeny enables a potential understanding of how operant conditioning 
shapes neurological associations as replicating components of behavior. These 
neurological associations may in turn be part of plastic properties of naturally 
selected adaptations (either with or without a significant history of Baldwinian 
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natural selection, as described in the chapter on the Baldwin Effect). The idea is that 
phylogenetic adaptations are further shaped, realized, enhanced and actualized 
through ontogenetic adaptation. 
One of my major points concerning our understanding of psychology is that we do 
not need to explain complex behavior by mediating variables, by reference to 
neurological structures (S-O-R). We can rather explain complex behavior as a set of 
neurological adaptations governed and shaped by ontogenetic contingencies 
extending phylogenetic contingencies. The state and structure of these neurological 
adaptations at any given time is a proximate cause of behavior, which observation is 
not necessarily needed to study the behavior-environment interactive component of 
behavior. 
Understanding psychology fields in terms of different causal categories may help 
enhance the cooperation between them. I think psychology eventually will align its 
fields along similar lines as I have described. Whether it will be behaviorist or not, 
there will eventually be a psychology of ultimate ontogenetic causation, extending 
phylogenetic which is distinguished from fields of studies which explain behavior in 
neurological, cognitive or mentalist terms. I suppose it probably will consider more 
directly or seamlessly how the cultural and non-cultural environment shapes 
neurology. 
If behaviorism is once again going to dominate psychology, it might as well become 
a “neurobehaviorism” in all possible fruitful ways. There is a need to align 
behaviorist terms consistently with neuroscience, in terms of behavior replicator units 
and the internal mechanisms of reinforcement. Insights in neuroscience and behavior 
analysis should complement each other. 
The operant regime I propose, lends itself from the notion that operant conditioning is 
a special form of measurement of function, parallel to that of fitness in phylogeny, 
even in an incredibly advanced organism like humans. Dennett (1995) challenges 
behaviorism in the most appropriate manner. Why would natural selection favor 
operant conditioning over thousands of other phylogenetic adaptations? The answer, I 
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suggest, is that operant conditioning is one of many adaptations indeed, but not 
necessarily an equal among others. The best argument for the sub-ordination of other 
adaptations under an operant regime is that operant conditioning performs has a 
history of unequaled adaptive function. That history is the selection of behavior 
adapted to novel environments, which produce consequences of stable historical 
reproductive value. 
Neo-Darwinian radical behaviorism, as I have put it forth is both a theory and a 
sketch for a philosophy of science. All the more important that it (hypothetically or 
actually) stands the trial of empirical judgment. I prefer that my proposed neo-
Darwinian radical behaviorism leads a Popperian faith, be it falsification or not. If it 
turns out to be inconsistent with empirical data, then it will be falsified and thus retain 
its status as an honorable attempt, and pave way to better approaches and better 
theories. Every true evolutionary theorist, one could say, is ready to falsify his own 
theory in the Popperian spirit.  
Cleaveland is highly critical of selectionist psychology often being held to be 
synonymous with operant conditioning (2002). While I may not share his worry I find 
it conceptually interesting and probably best to think of operant conditioning as one 
specific expression of ontogenetic selection generally. Internal, domain-specific 
mechanisms of selection, if identified, are not operant conditioning, because operant 
conditioning refers to operation upon the environment, and silent operation upon 
properties of the environment no longer present, for example through memorization. 
I think operant culture theory has many qualities I do not see elsewhere. It seamlessly 
connects biological evolution and culture, while nevertheless demonstrating the 
autonomy of culture and cultural evolution. This is true also for other approaches to 
Darwinian culture theory, but these seem to lack a defining selecting consequence, 
parallel to fitness. Thus the explanatory power of operant cultural theory is at an 
advantage, and makes perfect sense of why culture can carry so much maladaptive 
behavior, while still clearly being a Darwinian product of historical net adaptive 
value. 
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Unfortunately there are many important subjects that I did not manage to discuss and 
take into account properly, for example consciousness and mental states. I think it is 
important to have a clear theory of consciousness and mental states. I think 
consciousness and mental states can be discussed fruitfully within a system theoretic 
framework of brain-as-replicator. I think the approach of thinking about mental states 
as functional rather than physical states is incomprehensible—for something to be 
functional in a physical world it has to be physical. Mental states are probably 
physical properties with a functional value, but to what extent it makes sense to 
isolate their functionality from their neurological embodiment, is an important 
question. For example, the mental world connects millions of stimuli seamlessly 
together, but then again, isn’t that what the brain already does? At least it is good to 
know that there are always interesting subjects—new or largely unvisited terrains—
within philosophy to delve into. 
The final evaluation of my thesis is that it is somewhat successful considering the 
circumstances. I think I have managed to show, although less powerfully than I had 
hoped, that operant conditioning is worth at least considering as a defining 
functional-historical pattern in ontogeny and in cultural evolution. I also successfully 
argued that the classical radical behaviorism is inconsistent with modern evolutionary 
biology, but only to an extent where adjustments renew its relevance. Meanwhile, I 
am fairly confident that distinguishing between proximate and ultimate explanations, 
and interactors and replicators of behavior, in ontogeny is fruitful. I was to a lesser 
extent able to convincingly show that culture theory benefits from a distinction 
between replicator and interactor. I also think that it is of great benefit to view the 
relationship between biology and psychology more in terms of history; the lifetime of 
organisms extending the evolutionary histories of its species, rather than in terms of 
the mind-body dichotomy. All in all I drew a dim sketch of a philosophy of 
interdisciplinary science of behavior, but a sketch nonetheless. 
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